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ABSTRACT
Examining the Perceptions of Fake News, Verification,
and Notices on Twitter
Brendan Patrick Gwynn
School of Communications, BYU
Master of Arts
The rise of social media platforms has had a significant impact on the conventional model
of gatekeeping. With increased access to information—as well as the ability to contribute to the
public discourse—individuals no longer need to rely on the mass media for news. These realities
have led to increased conversations surrounding credibility in the digital age. Although not a new
concept, fake news has become increasingly common in recent years. The web—particularly
social media outlets, like Twitter—have enhanced the spread of misinformation. To combat this,
social media platforms have introduced gatekeeping features like verification marks and warning
labels. However, questions remain regarding the credibility and effectiveness of these features.
Furthermore, little information exists regarding the perceptions of these features. For this study,
the researcher examined the perceptions of fake news, verification, and Notices (i.e., warning
labels) as they relate to Twitter. These perceptions were captured through a survey that was
distributed to Twitter users through MTurk. Results were examined generally as well as in the
light of political orientation, ranging from very liberal to very conservative on a 4-point scale.
Within the scope and limitations of this study, results indicate that the majority of Twitter users
believe that fake news on the platform is a major problem. Additionally, results show that there
is no significant difference between the effectiveness of verification and the effectiveness of
Notices in slowing the spread of fake news, and neither feature is perceived as strongly credible
or effective.

Keywords: gatekeeping, fake news, Twitter, verification mark, media credibility, online news,
online information, internet as a news source, censorship, warning labels, social media
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Examining the Perceptions of Fake News, Verification,
and Notices on Twitter
Introduction
The launch of the internet near the turn of the century redefined not only how we
consume information, but also how we interact with each other (Gil, 2018). Perhaps the most
immediate contribution of this new global networking system was the increased access people
had to a wealth of information (Singer, 2001). In previous years, individuals had to rely on the
media to obtain their news (Messner & Garrison, 2009). But thanks to the internet, users can now
seek information from innumerable sources, any time of the day, at the mere click of a mouse
(Choi et al., 2006; Heinecke, 2019; Messner & Garrison, 2009). In addition, the smartphone has
enabled individuals to access information virtually anywhere (Napoli & Obar, 2014).
In its mere quarter century of existence, the internet has evolved to include streaming
services, blog sites, online forums, and social media platforms—all of which lend an immediate
voice to just about anyone who wants one (Blank, 2013). This period of increased user-generated
content is known as Web 2.0 (Allen, 2012). Cormode and Krishnamurthy (2008) explain that the
main difference between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 is the ease of content creation—a reality that can
largely be attributed to the resources, aids, and platforms that have been introduced to maximize
the potential to create content, including text, audio, and video. As a result, the internet is not
simply a universal source for obtaining information; it is also a universal place for sharing
information (Benham, 2020; Cormode & Krishnamurthy, 2008).
These realities have led to increased conversations surrounding credibility in the digital
age. Although not a new concept, fake news has become increasingly common in recent years
(Rubin, 2019; Sauer, 2017). The web—particularly social media outlets, like Twitter—has
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enhanced and quickened the spread of misinformation (Rubin, 2019), while the simplicity of
creating content has also contributed to inaccuracies published and shared on the web—both
intentionally and unintentionally.
To combat this, social media platforms have introduced features such as verification
marks (Cohen & Sutton, 2018) and warning labels (Gadde & Beykpour, 2020). However,
questions remain regarding the use of these features (Clayton et al., 2020; Pennycook et al.,
2020), including how effective they are in slowing the spread of fake news, how credible they
are, and how opinions about their use differ based on political orientation. Furthermore, limited
information exists regarding the perceptions of these features.
Because of this, it is worth exploring in greater depth how the ongoing development of
news creation and distribution has impacted the consumption of online news, particularly on
social media networks. This is especially important with the increased frequency of fake news—
a term that is often used synonymously with disinformation and misinformation (Kumar, 2020;
Rubin et al., 2015), and which is defined by Allcott and Gentzcow (2017) as “news articles that
are intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead readers” (p. 213).
The purpose of this particular study is to analyze the perceptions regarding fake news,
verification, and Notices (i.e., warning labels) on Twitter. This research will contribute to the
existing literature by offering insights into perceptions regarding efforts to combat the spread of
misinformation online. It will also explore Twitter as a platform—an area where the research is
less prevalent than other popular social media platforms. The overarching goal of this study is to
treat Twitter as a type of case study to further shed light on the implementation and impact of
verification marks and warning labels on the web, including if these features are perceived as
effective and credible.
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For this study, the researcher will capture perceptions by distributing a survey to Twitter
users that asks questions related to fake news, verification marks, and warning labels. The survey
will be created on Qualtrics and distributed through Amazon Mechanical Turk, targeting active
Twitter users from the United States ages 18-49. Results will be examined generally and in the
light of political orientation.
Literature Review
This literature review will rely on an assessment of gatekeeping as a practice, including
how the media has typically applied the process and how gatekeeping has evolved and expanded
as a result of the internet. Other related topics will also be examined, including credibility, fake
news, social media platforms as a news source, Twitter as a social media platform, verification
marks, warning labels, and censorship. Gatekeeping is a particularly important lens for this
research, not only because of its several applications on social media platforms—such as topdown, bottom-up, and algorithmic gatekeeping—but also because of how verification marks and
warning labels are unique applications of the practice.
Historical Background of Gatekeeping
The communications concept of gatekeeping—the process by which countless messages
are reduced to only a few—has its origins in food (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). Sociologist Kurt
Lewin, who coined the term in 1943, was curious as to how an individual could alter the food
habits of a population. This led him to create a model of how food travels through different
channels before it ultimately ends up on the dinner table (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). David
Manning White (1950), a professor at the University of Iowa, then extended this model to
communications messaging, focusing specifically on how the media determined which
information to distribute.

4
In the gatekeeping model, gates are decision points while gatekeepers are people or
policies that determine which messages come in and which messages stay out (White, 1950).
Thus, media gatekeeping is impacted by numerous elements, including instincts, deadlines, rules,
newsworthiness, competing stories, trends, goals, audiences, sources, job roles, government, and
space (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). However, gatekeeping does not end there. A new process
begins when audience members receive information from the media and make their own
decisions about what to allow through their individual gates (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009).
Therefore, individual gatekeeping practices are key to understanding the theory in a modern
context of the internet.
Gatekeeping in the Age of the Internet
Prior to the creation of the internet, individuals had limited access to news sources and
were effectively required to rely on the messages that made it through the media’s gates
(Messner & Garrison, 2009). But as the internet became a universal source of information,
consumers were less restricted by the effects of gatekeeping (Benham, 2020). The amount of
information available online meant that the historical applications of media gatekeeping would
be challenged, and traditional news sources would now have to compete with those publishing
messages on the web (Gil, 2018; Heinecke, 2019; Messner & Garrison, 2009), including blog
writers, social media influencers, religious leaders, and celebrities.
White could not have foreseen the impact that the internet would have on gatekeeping
and the traditional distribution methods of the media. However, while the gatekeeping forces are
continuing to evolve, the process itself is perhaps as universal as it has ever been, with each
individual having great control not only over what they consume, but also over what they share,
in what has been deemed a “two-step gatekeeping” process (Singer, 2014).
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This change in the gatekeeping process has had far-reaching effects. Research has shown
that the internet has significantly impacted the gatekeeping position formerly held by traditional
journalists (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2004). The public now has power to force the media’s
hand, shape the news, and influence public discourse (Messner & Garrison, 2009; Poor, 2006).
Digital channels—such as social media platforms, wikis, and blogs—provide the public with
countless ways to contribute information and opinions (Heinecke, 2019; Messner & Garrison,
2009). This shift highlights the era of the internet known as Web 2.0, which is differentiated
from the early days of the internet by the ease for anyone to create and share content (Cormode
& Krishnamurthy, 2008).
Credibility
With the internet increasing the number of voices adding to public discourse—as well as
allowing users to easily access limitless information—questions regarding news credibility have
become more prominent. Credibility has long been associated with trust (Metzger & Flanagin,
2013) and legitimacy (McClymount & Sheppard, 2020), and academic definitions often include
believability in their descriptions (Castillo et al., 2011; Metzger & Flanigan, 2013; Sikdar et al.,
2013). Nevertheless, credibility is a broad and elusive concept that can be difficult to define.
As has been noted in the literature, credibility is often specific to its particular context
(Keshavarz & Givi, 2020). In an online context, credibility can become quite complex because
information is usually impacted by numerous sources as it is disseminated (Sundar, 2008). Some
scholars have argued that online credibility consists of the source, the channel, and the message
(Metzger et al., 2016; Appelman & Sundar, 2016). These aspects have frequently been used in
communication scholarship (Keshavarz & Givi, 2020) and are evidence that multiple concepts
impact perceived credibility, particularly within media.
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Media Credibility
As defined by Chung et al. (2012), media credibility is “a perceived quality based on
multiple factors, including trustworthiness and expertise” (p. 173). Although this definition is a
helpful starting point, it does not specify all of the factors that contribute to media credibility—a
challenge for researchers that is evident in the existing literature.
Other researchers have identified elements that contribute to media credibility, such as
perceptions of bias, fairness, objectivity, accuracy, and believability (Sundar, 1999). Gaziano and
McGrath (1986) put together a more comprehensive list of subcomponents, which included: fair,
not biased, tells whole story, accurate, respects people’s privacy, watches after readers’/viewers’
interests, concerned about community’s well-being, separates fact and opinion, can be trusted,
concerned with public interest, is factual, and has well-trained reporters.
Appelman and Sundar (2016) explain that another difficulty related to media credibility is
the reality that communication is heavily integrated within the medium. For example, if the same
content were published by two different entities, individuals may judge the credibility differently
simply based on who published the information. In this instance, many factors may impact how
credibility is perceived, including author, editor, publisher, content, and platform (Appelman &
Sundar, 2016).
Further, measurement of credibility across online mediums is not consistent because it
can’t be. Various elements contribute to the credibility within each situation. For example, blog
credibility has been judged by elements such as authenticity, timeliness, and popularity (Kang &
Yang, 2011), while web credibility has been judged by elements such as page layout, URL, and
date, among other things (Dochterman & Stamp, 2010). These realities make it especially
difficult—if not impossible—to analyze credibility based on a standard set of criteria.
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Credibility of the Media
At the forefront of conversations surrounding media credibility are varying opinions
concerning the roles of the media and online information providers in delivering credible news
(Messner & Garrison, 2009). While some argue that media gatekeeping is dangerous because it
allows the media to dictate what information we receive, others counter that information under
such a model is much more likely to be vetted—which cannot always be said of information on
the internet (Benham, 2020).
Theoretically, media gatekeeping should be a process that includes vetting and brings
trust in standard news sources (Benham, 2020). Nevertheless, news outlets might push an
agenda, mislead the public, or even publish inaccurate stories—unintentionally or not (Singer,
2001). This can have a negative impact on trust in the media (Watts et al., 1999) and push
consumers to search for information elsewhere.
In addition, news outlets may withhold information from the public, leading nontraditional journalists and others—such as bloggers—to sidestep these traditional gatekeepers by
publishing the information anyway (Poor, 2006; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2004). These
instances can have unintended consequences for the traditional media by reducing trust and
forcing media outlets to publish news that they otherwise could have kept from the public. One
example of this occurred when a blogger published details about the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal
that the media had largely ignored initially (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2004).
Timing is another challenge that the media has faced in the digital age (Smith & Sissons,
2016). With news outlets wanting to be the first to publish information, fact-checking is
sometimes inhibited (Smith & Sissons, 2016). This type of media misconduct occurred in 2013
when San Francisco television station KTVU reported the names of the pilots involved in an

8
Asiana Airlines crash, stating that they had been verified by the National Transportation Safety
Board (Laing, 2013). However, the reported names proved to be fake—and were also racially
insensitive—leading to criticism of KTVU’s verification process (Laing, 2013).
While this particular error was not directly tied to the internet, the omnipresence of online
news from both traditional and unconventional sources has led organizations to sometimes cut
corners, thus further harming people’s confidence in the media (Smith & Sissons, 2016).
Credibility of Online Sources
On the other side of the debate, those who use the internet to consume and distribute
news are not exempt from these challenges of credibility (Messner & Garrison, 2009).
Information on the web is often quite credible (Messner & Garrison, 2009), but the growth of
misinformation published on the internet by unvetted gatekeepers is becoming a threat to
balanced journalism (Benham, 2020; Heinecke, 2019).
Interestingly, early studies measuring the accuracy of online information indicated that
internet users considered online news more credible than traditional counterparts—a result of the
perceived credibility that stemmed from the growing popularity of the internet (Johnson & Kaye,
2000). In a 2003 survey, Johnson and Kaye (2004) found that blogs were ranked as more
credible than traditional news sources.
In recent years, however, individuals have begun to find less credibility in both
traditional and online sources (Rubin, 2019). Results from the Edelman Trust Barometer (2020)
indicated that 57% of individuals believed that the media they used was contaminated with
untrustworthy information. In addition, 76% were worried about fake news being used as a
weapon (Edelman, 2020). These growing concerns about credibility raise questions about what
internet outlets and online gatekeepers are doing to slow or prevent the spread of fake news.
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Overview of Fake News
Fake news is not a new concept, but the spread of inaccurate information has been
enhanced by the internet, particularly social media platforms (Rubin, 2019). The surge of false
information in recent years—as well as former United States President Donald Trump’s
emphasis on the topic—led Collins Dictionary to choose “fake news” as its word of the year in
2017 (Sauer, 2017).
The existing literature on fake news indicates that there are countless types and
definitions. Rubin et al. (2015) identified three categories of fake news, namely: (a) serious
fabrications, (b) large-scale hoaxes, and (c) humorous fakes. In addition, Tandoc et al. (2017)
reviewed 34 academic papers on the subject and found six overarching definitions: (a) news
satire, (b) news parody, (c) fabrication, (d) manipulation, (e) advertising, and (f) propaganda.
After interviewing journalism professionals, Benham (2019) added “imbalance” as a seventh
overarching definition of fake news—a category used when news is so unbalanced or infused
with opinion that it can no longer be considered accurate.
Tandoc et al. (2017) noted the commonality across these definitions: that fake news
assumes the appearance of real news, including how websites look, how articles are structured,
and how images include photo credit. Moreover, bots imitate the pervasiveness of news by
constructing a system of fake websites (Tandoc et al., 2017).
Although certain categories of fake news may not have significant negative impact, other
types can have severe consequences. Some common topics of misinformation are science,
politics, terrorism, natural disasters, and urban legends (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Fake news can
therefore influence political campaigns, create mass hysteria, contribute to polarization, and
impact markets, among other things (Vosoughi et al., 2018).
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A research study conducted by Zakharov et al. (2019) examined the perceptions of the
content, purpose, and sources of fake news among college students. The researchers found mixed
opinions regarding these topics, but one notable discovery was that many students had difficulty
distinguishing opinion pieces from fake news (Zakharov et al., 2019).
Additionally, while the motives behind fake news vary, researchers and the public alike
suggest that a significant reason for spreading fake news is to push a personal or political agenda,
or to receive financial or personal gain (Zakharov et al., 2019). Some scholars have included the
term “intentional” in their definitions of fake news (Frank, 2015; Pubjabi, 2017), but other
scholars feel that sharing fake news is not always done purposely or maliciously (Rubin, 2017).
Zakharov and her colleagues (2019) also found that just under half of those who participated in
their research study believed fake news was intentional.
For the purpose of this paper, fake news will be defined as false information used to
mislead the recipient by imitating credibility (Allcott & Gentzcow, 2017; Benham, 2019; White,
2017). The topic will be further examined specifically in the context of social media platforms in
the following sections of this literature review.
Social Media as a News Source
Results from a 2018 Pew Research Center survey showed that 68% of adults in the
United States obtained news through social media (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Newman et al.
(2016) found that social media is the most important news source among those ages 18-24. The
top three news-focused social media sites are Reddit, Twitter, and Facebook (Shearer & Matsa,
2018). Seventy-three percent of Reddit users utilize the platform for news, while 71% of Twitter
users and 67% of Facebook users do the same with those respective platforms (Shearer & Matsa,
2018).
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Consumers most often identified convenience as the biggest benefit of obtaining news
this way (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). However, 57% of these consumers indicated that they expect
news on social media channels to be predominantly inaccurate (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). In fact,
inaccuracy was the top concern raised about obtaining information on social media (Shearer &
Matsa, 2018).
In spite of these concerns, social media platforms continue to grow in popularity, making
them an ideal location for individuals and organizations to post and share information (Shearer &
Matsa, 2018). For this research, emphasis will be placed on Twitter, largely because Twitter is a
uniquely public platform—meaning that most information can be accessed without needing an
account—and because it was the first channel to implement a verification feature (Cohen &
Sutton, 2018).
Twitter: Social Media Platform and Micro-Blogging Site
According to Statista, Twitter boasts approximately 330 million active monthly users
across the globe (Clement, 2019) and is one of the most popular social media platforms in the
United States, with nearly 70 million American users as of October 2020 (Clement, 2020). Like
other channels, Twitter has features such as likes, re-posts, mentions, and replies that help track
reach and engagement. Re-posts on Twitter are known as Retweets, which “are distinguished by
the Retweet icon and the name of the person who Retweeted the Tweet” (“Retweet FAQs,” n.d.,
para. 3). In addition to text, Tweets can include images, videos, and links.
One feature that differentiates Twitter from its competitors is the platform’s 280character limit for Tweets, which was expanded from 140 characters in 2017 (Rosen, 2017). In
addition to being a social networking site, Twitter is considered a micro-blogging site since
Tweet character limits led the platform to become a place for quick dissemination of news
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(Hermida, 2010). Political news is among the most popular types (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Wojcik
& Hughes, 2019), but the site is also known for sports, religion, economics, travel, health, and
more. According to a 2019 survey, Twitter is the most preferred social media platform for news
consumption, with 56% of respondents indicating that they used the platform for news (Statista
Research Department, 2021b). The next closest platform was Facebook, with 38% (Statista
Research Department, 2021b).
Another element that makes Twitter unique is its openness. While some accounts are
private—and therefore have protected Tweets—research has shown that approximately 87% are
public (Remy, 2019). When an individual creates an account, Tweets are set to public by default,
meaning that anyone can view and interact with their Tweets (“About public and protected
Tweets,” n.d.).
Fake News on Twitter
While Twitter is not the only social media platform that deals with bots and fake quotes,
the network is notorious for these issues, which contribute to the spread of false information
(Kirner-Ludwig, 2019; Wojcik et al., 2018). Researchers from the Pew Research Center analyzed
a random sample of 1.2 million Tweets and discovered that—among news and current event
websites—66% of Tweeted links to popular websites were made by suspected bots (Wojcik et
al., 2018).
Nevertheless, researchers at MIT discovered that bots spread both accurate and false
information at the same rate (Vosoughi et al., 2018). They also found that fake news travels six
times quicker on Twitter than true stories (Dizikes, 2018) and indicated that humans are largely
responsible for the large scale spread of fake news despite testimony before congressional
committees that concentrated on bots as a culprit (Vosoughi et al., 2018).
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Gatekeeping on Social Media Platforms
Although users effectively control what information they receive on social platforms—
through features like following, friending, liking, and subscribing—algorithms, trending topics,
recommendations, and paid advertisements also play a role in what type of content users will be
shown. In this sense, algorithms serve as gatekeepers (Gil, 2018).
Many of these features are designed to improve and enhance the user experience (Gil,
2018), and some even have the capability of limiting the spread of fake news. But as with most
beneficial elements, there can also be negative consequences, such as removing quality content
from the discussion or unintentionally silencing voices. The intricacies of gatekeeping on social
media platforms continues to expand as algorithms, executives, and users further impact how
information is seen and received.
Algorithmic Gatekeeping
Algorithmic gatekeeping has become increasingly complex and controversial in recent
years because algorithms can go well beyond what users are self-selecting to amplify content that
social platforms choose, which may be driven by money, popularity, or agendas. While
algorithms certainly drive users to content which is related to their interests and even valuable,
these processes also have the capability to unintentionally endorse controversial content and
voices (Darcy, 2019).
On Twitter in particular, the platform’s algorithm often fills feeds with popular content
that is not promoted nor sought out by users (Darcy, 2019). Twitter has stated that this decision
was made to further expose users to content they might be interested in (Darcy, 2019). However,
this effort brings with it not only the capability of sharing irrelevant content but also of spreading
misinformation and amplifying fake news (Darcy, 2019). Furthermore, some Twitter users have
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been frustrated by this feature, emphasizing that if they wanted those Tweets to show up in their
feed, they would follow those individuals (Darcy, 2019).
Top-down Gatekeeping
Connected with algorithmic gatekeeping is the concept of top-down gatekeeping. While
not much specific information exists regarding how executives and others within a company may
be influencing what content gets through the gates, platforms have certainly made known some
of their more obvious efforts, such as the implementation of warning labels—an effort which
will be discussed later in this literature review.
Nevertheless, some social media users have accused platforms of limiting voices (Darcy,
2019), and recent research suggests that there tends to be a political bias in censorship (Stjernfelt
& Lauritzen, 2020). Specifically on Twitter, a growing number of individuals have accused the
platform of “shadow banning,” the practice of suspending a user without their knowledge and
which prevents their content from being seen (Darcy, 2019). Although Twitter has denied this
behavior (Darcy, 2019), it is clear that some users are skeptical of the possibilities associated
with top-down gatekeeping.
Bottom-up Gatekeeping
Another reality impacting content consumption on social media platforms is that of user
or bottom-up gatekeeping. Users on social media have long had the ability to report content for
being offensive, but controversies of recent years have led to increased reporting and suspension
for content being dangerous or misleading (Newberry, 2021). These reports are reviewed in
relation to platform rules and may result in removal.
On Twitter in particular, accounts may be suspended for things such as impersonation,
abusive behavior, hateful conduct, and dangerous rhetoric (“About suspended accounts,” n.d.).

15
Twitter’s Transparency site posts reports in six-month increments that provide numbers for the
number of accounts reports, accounts suspended, and content removed. In its most recent report
featuring January 2021 to June 2021, Twitter noted that 1.2 million of the 4.8 million accounts
reported were suspended, and that 5.9 million pieces of content were removed for violating
safety, privacy, or authenticity rules (“Rules Enforcement,” 2022).
In 2021, Twitter introduced Birdwatch, a “pilot in the US of a new community-driven
approach to help address misleading information on Twitter” (Coleman, 2021, para. 1). Although
the concept is still being built out, the idea is that users have the capability to identify details of a
Tweet that they find to be misleading and can then write notes that provide helpful context and
information (Coleman, 2021). Other users will be able to see these notes and rate them based on
their helpfulness (Coleman, 2021). In its pilot stage, Twitter is keeping notes on a separate site
from Twitter but hopes to build the capability to view notes directly into Twitter in the future
(Coleman, 2021). As such, this offering is another method for users to be involved in content
moderation and the fight against fake news.
Combatting Fake News on Social Media Platforms
The importance of individual gatekeeping is especially relevant when obtaining news via
social media. Fact-checking websites have emerged to help combat the spread of misinformation
and fake news on social channels (Amazeen et al., 2019; Hameleers et al., 2020), but such sites
are only beneficial if they are seen and utilized (Amazeen et al., 2019).
Recent research indicates that individuals who encounter digital misinformation are
rarely provided with fact-check options (Guess et al., 2017). Sites like Google, Facebook, and
Twitter have begun developing solutions that aim to address this lack of fact-checking ability
(Gadde & Beykpour, 2020; Lewandowsky et al., 2017); nevertheless, individuals should be
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active consumers of news rather than passive recipients if they are to ensure that accurate
information is passing through their own gates (Hameleers et al., 2020).
Furthermore, consumers in the digital age have a responsibility to fact-check information
found online before sharing it on their channels (Hameleers et al., 2020). Fact-checking is
growing in popularity (Amazeen et al., 2019; Hameleers et al., 2020), but due to the possibility
of posts going viral on social channels—and because online vetting is often limited to personal
gatekeeping efforts—fake news still thrives on sites like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter
(Vosoughi et al., 2018).
While older generations are more likely to seek out fact-checking websites (Calvillo et
al., 2020), younger generations are becoming increasingly more skeptical. Marchi (2012) found
that teenagers on average tend to believe that traditional media is corrupt, and that social media
allows people to voice the truth. Younger individuals are inclined to desire opinionated news
rather than objective news (Marchi, 2012).
Another challenge that social media users face is knowing how to judge the credibility of
content. On Twitter in particular, Castillo et al. (2011) found that perceptions of news credibility
can be impacted by aspects such as visual design and the perceived gender of the author. In a
study about information on Twitter, Azer et al. (2021) discovered that factors including time,
effort, informal language, and the limited size of Tweet length can make it difficult to judge
credibility on the platform.
In response to difficulties like this, computer systems have been developed to analyze
Tweets for credibility, looking at elements such as social tags and sentiment (Azer et al., 2021).
These systems also compare Tweets against “trusted” content in the system (Azer et al., 2021),
but these determinations are still vulnerable to error and can be impacted by human biases.
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In recent years, Twitter and other social media sites have wrestled with how to handle
fake news on their platforms and have begun seeking additional solutions (Lewandowsky et al.,
2017). Twitter has attempted to combat the spread of misinformation in a number of ways—
some of which were mentioned previously—but perhaps the two most recognized are the use of
the verification mark (Cohen & Sutton, 2018) and the application of warning labels (Gadde &
Beykpour, 2020).
History and Overview of the Twitter Verification Mark
Introduced by Twitter in 2009, the verification mark was designed to indicate authenticity
(Cohen & Sutton, 2018). Twitter initially used the feature to verify prominent businesses,
organizations, journalists, and politicians (O’Sullivan, 2020), but for a short time in 2016,
Twitter opened verification to anybody who wanted to apply (Tsukayama, 2016). The feature
was also adopted by other social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube
(Paul et al., 2019).
While social media platforms have long stressed that verification does not equal
endorsement, research shows that accounts and individuals with a verified status receive
enhanced credibility (Paul et al., 2019). Due to confusion and misinterpretation among users,
social platforms have begun rethinking how they grant verification (Cohen & Sutton, 2018). In
2018, Twitter acknowledged that the use of the feature had led to uncertainty, posting on its
platform, “Verification was meant to authenticate identity & voice but it is interpreted as an
endorsement or an indicator of importance. We recognize that we have created this confusion
and need to resolve it” (Twitter Support, 2017).
These acknowledgements and revisions have sometimes been the result of platform
blunders or controversies. In 2017, Twitter received backlash after verifying an individual named
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Jason Kessler, who some had labeled as “alt-right” (Sokol, 2017). Kessler’s verification mark
was soon taken away, and others deemed to be in the far-right movement also had their marks
removed (Sokol, 2017).
In response, Kessler accused Twitter of silencing conservative voices and condemned the
platform for being one-sided (Sokol, 2017). Of the decision, Yair Rosenberg, a writer for Jewish
publication Tablet Magazine, Tweeted, “Whoever advised Twitter to turn verification into an
approbation of views rather than a confirmation of identity did not think this through. Now
Twitter can be held accountable for every controversial thing said by a blue checkmark” 1
(Rosenberg, 2017; Sokol, 2017).
Following this controversy with Kessler, Twitter suspended its verification process for a
time (Bowles, 2017). After the process was ultimately reinstated, the platform once again faced
criticism after a high school student in upstate New York managed to get an account verified for
a fictitious United States Senate candidate (O’Sullivan, 2020).
These examples pose serious questions regarding the use and purpose of the verification
feature. If Twitter introduced the verification mark to authenticate identity and voice, why would
the platform strip legitimate individuals of their verified status? In addition, does such an action
contradict Twitter’s claim that verification marks do not equal endorsement? If most people
interpret Twitter verification marks as a sign of importance, is this an example of censorship?
Recent Changes to Twitter’s Verification Program
Since these controversies, Twitter has updated its explanation of verification status to
include additional information on the process (“Verified account FAQs,” n.d.). According to
Twitter’s help site in late 2020, “An account may be verified if it is determined to be an account
of public interest. Typically this includes accounts maintained by users in music, acting, fashion,
1

Note: The Tweet appears to have since been deleted.
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government, politics, religion, journalism, media, sports, business, and other key interest areas”
(“About verified accounts,” n.d., para. 2). And, as previously stated by the platform, verification
does not indicate endorsement (“Verified account FAQs,” n.d.).
Twitter also published details regarding the loss of verification status. The company
reserved the right to remove verification for behaviors on and off Twitter, including misleading
people; promoting hate and violence; attacking people based on race, ethnicity, orientation,
gender, age, ideology, religious affiliation, etc.; supporting organizations who promote
prejudiced attitudes; harassment; engaging in violent and dangerous behavior; posting disturbing,
violent, or gruesome imagery; promoting terrorism; promoting suicide or self-harm; or violating
the Twitter terms of service (“Verified account FAQs,” n.d.).
While these pages clarified Twitter’s definition of verification—as well as explained the
platform’s stance on granting and removing verification status—the feature underwent additional
updates in following months. As of January 2022, Twitter indicates that “the blue verified badge
on Twitter lets people know that an account of public interest is authentic” (“Verification FAQ,”
n.d.). The platform states that your account must be “notable and active” to qualify for verified
status, the six types of which are: government; companies, brands, and non-profit organizations;
news organizations and journalists; entertainment; sports and esports; activists, organizers, and
other influential individuals (“Verification FAQ,” n.d.).
Furthermore, Twitter relaunched the ability to apply for or request verification, which
was reimplemented in May 2021 (Twitter Inc., 2021). This action came in response to feedback
from Twitter users and led the platform to remove verification from accounts that no longer met
the qualifications (Twitter Inc., 2021). The company indicated that the “application rollout marks
the next milestone in our plans to give more transparency, credibility and clarity to verification
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on Twitter” (Twitter Inc., 2021). One of the main reasons Twitter updated its verification
program was to encourage healthy dialogue and to allow users to better determine if the
conversations they are having are trustworthy (Twitter Inc., 2021).
Twitter Verification and Credibility
According to a research study conducted by Edgerly and Vraga (2019), verification
marks on Twitter do not increase perceived credibility of a post or account. The results of this
study refuted the prevailing view that verification marks impact how people make credibility
judgments on the platform. Instead, “account ambiguity and congruency were more powerful
cues in assessing credibility” (Edgerly & Vraga, 2019, p. 286). Thus, preliminary research
suggests that Twitter users rely on other cues to determine the credibility of a Tweet—not a
verification mark.
Number of likes, number of Retweets, Tweet sentiment, and trusted URLs are features
that have been identified as “credibility detectors” (Azer et al., 2021). Additionally, Zubiaga and
Ji (2014) found that readily available features such as profile handle, profile picture, and images
used in a Tweet can impact how consumers view news. These researchers also noted that poor
grammar and spelling do not appear to make much of a difference on how people determine
credibility (Zubiaga & Ji, 2014). However, making the extra click to view the profile associated
with a Tweet can be the difference between correctly identifying a Tweet as accurate or as fake
(Zubiaga & Ji, 2014).
Edgerly and Vraga (2019) suggest that the value of the verification mark may have been
diminished and diluted due to Twitter’s decision to offer verification to anyone. The number of
verified accounts on the platform jumped from 150,000 (Kamps, 2015) to 300,000 in less than
three years (Edgerly & Vraga, 2019). While this number still represents a relatively tiny portion
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of Twitter users (Kamps, 2015), the increased prevalence of Twitter verification—especially on
more visible accounts—might reduce its usefulness, regardless of what Twitter’s goal for the
feature ultimately is.
Nevertheless, the existing literature regarding Twitter verification and credibility was
written prior to the platform’s recent updates to the program. It is clear that verification marks as
they are currently utilized by Twitter are a form of gatekeeping designed to enable users to make
better judgments regarding the credibility and trustworthiness of content (Twitter Inc., 2021). As
such, these alterations are likely to influence perceptions regarding how verification impacts (a)
the spread of fake news, and (b) the credibility of the feature itself.
Research on Warning Labels
Another prominent feature making its way to social media platforms in the fight against
fake news is the warning label. Disclaimer and warning labels have been used over the years to
address body image (Fardouly & Holland, 2018), alcohol (Lou & Alhabash, 2020), historically
insensitive material (McGowan, 2018), and general information (Clayton et al., 2020; Pennycook
et al., 2020), among other things. These disclaimers and labels have appeared in places such as
traditional advertising (Fardouly & Holland, 2018; Lou & Alhabash, 2020), movies (McGowan,
2018), and social media outlets (Clayton et al., 2020; Lou & Alhabash, 2020; Pennycook et al.,
2020).
Research has shown that although there has been a growing interest in disclaimers and
warning labels, these efforts are often ineffective in addressing the concerns of public officials
and society at large (Fardouly & Holland, 2018; Pennycook et al., 2020). Nevertheless, social
media platforms have begun adopting this feature as a way to combat the spread of fake news
(Clayton et al., 2020; Colliander, 2019).
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Warning Labels on Social Media Platforms
Researchers from Dartmouth found that false headlines on social media platforms were
perceived as less accurate by those who received general warnings about misinformation or
when headlines include a tag that read “Disputed” or “Rated False” (Clayton et al., 2020).
However, general warnings also lessened belief in the legitimacy of true headlines, indicating
that warning labels also have the potential to decrease belief in true information (Clayton et al.,
2020).
Additionally, Pennycook et al. (2020) discovered that although warning labels led to a
modest reduction in perceived accuracy of false headlines, the existence of warning tags caused
headlines that were untagged to be viewed as more accurate. These researchers concluded that
because of these results, using warning labels to counter misinformation presents a potential
challenge and concern, especially since producing misinformation is easier than exposing it
(Pennycook et al., 2020).
Colliander (2019) found that comments made by other social media users had a greater
likelihood than warning labels of dissuading the belief in and stopping the spread of fake news.
Colliander’s research (2019) suggests that users opt to rely on other consumers as a guide when
it comes to online disinformation rather than trusting the stage crew of social media platforms to
tell them what is credible—a claim supported by results from a 2021 survey, which indicates that
an astounding 75% of social media users do not trust platforms to make fair content moderation
decisions (Kemp & Ekins, 2021). Colliander (2019) indicates that this might be the reason social
media outlets are moving away from warning labels, but certainly in the case of Twitter, the
platform has only been more vigorous in adding additional types of warning labels—or Notices,
as they are known on Twitter (“Notices on Twitter,” n.d.).
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History and Overview of Twitter Notices
Within the last few years, Twitter has been actively creating a variety of Notices that can
be applied to Tweets to provide context for consumers (“Notices on Twitter,” n.d.). As of 2022,
Twitter teams and systems can add Notices to restrict immediate access to Tweets for any of the
following: graphic violence or adult content, violation of Twitter Rules, controversial content,
disputed or misleading information, manipulated media, or suspended accounts (“Notices on
Twitter,” n.d.).
In June 2019, the company introduced a new notice to provide clarity for situations where
Tweets violated rules but were left on the platform (Twitter Safety, 2019). Twitter explained that
it occasionally allows controversial content to remain online when there is a public interest in its
availability but adds a notice about the violation of rules and limits the Tweet’s engagement
(Twitter Safety, 2019).
The notice was seen as a response to complaints made by activists regarding exemptions
that have been given to prominent leaders who have violated Twitter Rules (Ortutay, 2019). The
company had previously stated that allowing controversial Tweets to be published by leaders
holds them accountable and encourages discussion (Ortutay, 2018).
In 2020, Twitter introduced several new Notices, including warning labels for Tweets
that contain synthetic and manipulated media, and warning labels for Tweets that contain
unverified claims, disputed claims, or misleading information (Roth & Pickles, 2020). The
platform’s new policy goes so far as to remove Tweets that contain “severe” misleading
information (Roth & Pickles, 2020).
Twitter took additional steps in October 2020. Those who attempt to Retweet posts that
have a misleading information label are given a prompt directing them to credible information
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about a topic before they can share it (Gadde & Beykpour, 2020). Twitter also added warnings
and restrictions to Tweets from political figures that have a misleading information label (Gadde
& Beykpour, 2020). Individuals who encounter these Tweets must now click through a warning
and will not be able to Retweet, reply, or like (Gadde & Beykpour, 2020). The platform also deamplifies other Tweets with labels by limiting engagement and ensuring that such Tweets do not
show up in searches, notifications, recommendations, timelines, and feeds (Gadde & Beykpour,
2020).
Censorship Questions on Twitter
While verification and Notices are designed to limit the spread of misinformation,
questions remain about their effectiveness and credibility. In addition, opinions differ on the use
of features that intentionally silence voices. Some individuals felt the new Notice implemented in
June 2019—which allowed rule-breaking content to stay on the platform when it was deemed to
be in the interest of the public—was a step in the right direction but did not go far enough
(Ortutay, 2019). Keegan Hankes, a research analyst for the Southern Poverty Law Center’s
Intelligence Project, felt that Twitter’s decision to leave this content on the platform indicated
that hate speech can be in the public interest—a point he disagreed with (Ortutay, 2019). But
others have expressed opposing views, indicating that it is not in the interest of the people to
allow social media platforms to prevent open expression (Daseler, 2019).
Twitter has long faced competing opinions on content restrictions, but as a private
corporation, the organization has the right to prohibit what is posted on its platform (Daseler,
2019). Nevertheless, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy stated in a 2017 ruling that the
internet is “the modern public square” (Daseler, 2019), which calls into question whether these
platforms should still have the ability to censor opinions.
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Censorship on social media is not a new trend, but it continues to become more and more
relevant. A recent analysis of content that was removed from social platforms suggests that there
is a political bias in censorship (Stjernfelt & Lauritzen, 2020). Moreover, concerns have been
raised regarding who determines what should be censored, even with topics that are scientific or
objective in nature (Niemiec, 2020).
Questions also remain regarding who should be allowed to define what information is
inaccurate or harmful, as well as whether these individuals can be trusted (Niemiec, 2020).
Niemiec (2020) points out that major social media platforms have cited the World Health
Organization (WHO) as an authoritative voice during the COVID-19 pandemic, but that even an
established organization such as this can make mistakes. For example, some individuals voiced
concerns about how pharmaceutical companies were able to influence WHO’s guidelines during
the 2009 swine flu pandemic (Cohen & Carter, 2010).
Along the same lines, many news outlets and even fact-checking platforms—such as
PolitiFact—initially disputed the claim that the COVID-19 pandemic began as an outbreak from
a lab, labeling it as a conspiracy theory. However, PolitiFact and others later retracted statements
as more information became available (Adams, 2021). An editor’s note by Li-Men Yan on
PolitiFact from May 2021 reads:
When this fact-check was first published in September 2020, PolitiFact’s sources
included researchers who asserted the SARS-CoV-2 virus could not have been
manipulated. That assertion is now more widely disputed. For that reason, we are
removing this fact-check from our database pending a more thorough review. Currently,
we consider the claim to be unsupported by evidence and in dispute. The original factcheck in its entirety is preserved below for transparency and archival purposes. (para. 1)
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Social media platforms also censored individuals for this claim, going so far as to remove
user posts for claiming that COVID-19 was man-made or came from a lab (Lima, 2021; Rosen,
2021). In May 2021, Facebook updated its misinformation policy surrounding COVID-19 to no
longer censor individuals for this claim (Rosen, 2021). The company said that the reason for this
was due to renewed debate surrounding the origins of the virus (Lima, 2021).
These realities are important to note because they not only prove that fact-checking sites
can be wrong but also highlight that warning labels can be misapplied. Furthermore, verification
status on Twitter in particular can be impacted by the platform determining that a user has posted
misleading information (“Verified account FAQs,” n.d.), meaning that some verified individuals
may have been censored or stripped of verification status for claims that were initially seen as
inaccurate but which were later deemed debatable (Lima, 2021).
As mentioned previously, a 2021 CATO Institute poll found that 75% of Americans lack
confidence that social media platforms will be fair in their content moderation decisions (Kemp
& Ekins, 2021). Results from this same survey indicate that 54% of polled Americans were more
concerned about social media platforms censoring truth than they were about the spread of fake
news (Kemp & Ekins, 2021). A large reason for this may be due to the fact that social media
companies are largely distrusted by Americans as a whole, regardless of political orientation
(Kemp & Ekins, 2021). Nevertheless, it is important to understand how political identification
may impact attitudes regarding efforts to combat fake news on Twitter, including censorship.
Political Identification in the United States
Research indicates that political orientation in the United States is nearly evenly split
among three main groups—independent at 34%, Democrat at 33%, and Republican at 29%
(Gramlich, 2020). Nearly half (48%) of registered voters in the United States are between the
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ages of 18 and 49, with 49% of those leaning or identifying as Democrat and only 42% leaning
or identifying as Republican (Gramlich, 2020).
Notably, eligible voters between the ages of 18 and 49 have historically been less likely
to vote than older generations. Millennials and Gen X both saw an increase in voting turnout in
2016, with 50.8% of Millennials and 62.6% of Gen X voting, up 4.4% and 1.2%, respectively
(Krogstad & Lopez, 2017). However, these numbers pale in comparison with Boomers and
Silent/Greatest, with both groups hovering around 70% (Krogstad & Lopez, 2017). Nevertheless,
voter turnout among those ages 18-34 rose to 57% in 2020—an increase from 49% in 2016
according to the United States Census Bureau (Fabina, 2021).
Political Identification and Activity on Twitter
According to a 2019 Pew Research study, Twitter users are more likely to identify as
Democrats than Republicans, with 60% leaning or being Democrat and 35% leaning or being
Republican (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019). Among those ages 18 to 49, this figure is even larger,
with nearly two-thirds (63%) leaning or being Democrat (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019).
In alignment with these findings, the platform tends to be much more liberal than
conservative and is less conservative than the general United States population (Wojcik &
Hughes, 2019). While approximately 25% of Americans identify as “very conservative,” Pew
Research found that only 12% of Twitter users do (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019).
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that Twitter users are more likely to be politically
active according to current research (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019). Sixty percent of Twitter users
voted in the 2018 midterm elections while only 55% of United States adults could say the same
(Wojcik & Hughes, 2019). Results from Pew Research Center indicate that 42% of Twitter users
in the United States use the site to discuss politics at least occasionally (Hughes & Wojcik,
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2019). Of the top 10 percent of Tweeters, 42% indicated that they had sent at least one political
Tweet in the last 30 days (Hughes & Wojcik, 2019).
Political Identification and Fake News
Researchers have found that both liberals and conservatives associate left-leaning and
right-leaning news platforms that oppose their political identification with the term “fake news”
(van der Linden et al., 2020). While information regarding the relationship between acceptance
of fake news and political orientation continues to develop, current research indicates that
conservatives are more likely to believe misinformation than liberals (see Fessler et al., 2017;
Miller et al., 2016). Jost (2017) suggests that this is because of differences in cognitive processes
that exist between the two groups while Miller et al. (2016) and Fessler et al. (2017) suggest that
the reason is because conservatives view the world as more complex and threatening and are
more susceptible to uncertainty.
In a similar vein, Guess et al. (2017) found that those who supported Hillary Clinton in
the 2016 United States election were more likely to fact check than those who supported Donald
Trump. Other research has also indicated that liberal-leaning individuals and those who voted for
Clinton were more likely to fact-check (Amazeen et al., 2019).
When it comes to the use of warning labels on social media posts, Mena (2019) found
that warning labels reduced the intent to share fake news among Democrats, Independents, and
Republicans. However, those who identified as Democrats and Independents were more likely
than Republicans to share news posts that contained false information regardless of whether a
warning label was present or not (Mena, 2019).
In contrast to this research, Grinberg et al. (2019) found that conservatives were more
likely to share fake news during the 2016 United States election than their liberal counterparts.
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Additionally, Pennycook and Rand (2019b) conducted a study that suggested liberal individuals
were more likely to identify fake news than conservatives, and Calvillo et al. (2020) found that
conservatives were less accurate in distinguishing between real and fake headlines.
Calvillo et al. (2020) suggest that political framing done by political leadership and the
media can have a significant impact on the perceptions of fake news. These researchers indicate
that once an issue becomes politicized, the way it is framed may impact the way it is perceived
(Calvillo et al., 2020). But even though individuals on both sides of the political aisle are
susceptible to fake news, Faragó and her colleagues (2020) discovered that the acceptance of
pro-government and anti-government fake news was more driven by partisanship than it was by
political orientation.
Political Identification and Social Media Gatekeeping Practices
Kemp and Ekins (2021) report that strong liberals are much more likely than strong
conservatives to report content on social media platforms. Research shows that this behavior is
heavily correlated with political identification, with 65% of strong liberals and 44% of moderate
liberals having done so while 24% of strong conservatives and 21% of moderate conservatives
have done so (Kemp & Ekins, 2021).
In relation to these statistics, conservatives are more likely to be censored on social media
platforms and are more likely to have their accounts suspended (Kemp & Ekins, 2021; Stjernfelt
& Lauritzen, 2020). Kemp and Ekins (2021) indicate that more than a third of conservatives have
personally experienced a post being reported or removed, while only a fifth of liberals have. The
reason for this may be the differing political opinions regarding the removal of content on social
platforms, with 80% of strong conservatives saying platforms are going too far and 68% of
strong liberals saying they’re not doing enough (Kemp & Ekins, 2021).
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Research Questions
While consumers still have access to significant amounts of information across the web,
Twitter’s use of verification marks and Notices limits what content users receive, sometimes at
the expense of accurate information (Kemp & Ekins, 2021). This is particularly important as
more and more individuals are using these outlets for news (Shearer & Matsa, 2018).
These applications of social media gatekeeping call into question not only their
effectiveness in slowing the spread of false information, but also whether users consider them to
be credible. More understanding is needed regarding the perceptions surrounding these specific
Twitter features as well as how fake news is viewed on the platform. With this in mind, the
following research questions have been proposed for further examination:
RQ1: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding fake news?
RQ2: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the credibility of
verification?
RQ3: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the effectiveness of
verification in slowing the spread of fake news?
RQ4: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the credibility of Notices?
RQ5: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the effectiveness of Notices
in slowing the spread of fake news?
RQ6: Do the perceptions surrounding fake news, verification, and Notices differ based
on the political identification of the Twitter user?
Methods
This study was conducted through the distribution and quantitative analysis of a survey,
which was created using Qualtrics, distributed through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and analyzed
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using SPSS Statistics. The research relied on allocated funds of $500 from the BYU School of
Communications and resulted in 286 valid responses.
Population Description
The population for this research was active Twitter users, ages 18-49. As defined in the
research, an active user was any consumer who accesses the platform at least once a month—a
metric that Twitter previously reported, and which is still used by other data reporters (Statista
Research Department, 2022).
The purpose of analyzing active users was two-fold: one, they were likely to use Twitter
for news consumption (Statista Research Department, 2021b), and two, they were very likely to
have encountered warning labels on the platform. The main reason the researcher surveyed and
analyzed users ages 18-49 is because nearly 70% of Twitter users are between the ages of 18 to
49 (Statista Research Department, 2021a). Additionally, the proposed age range includes more
than 50% of the registered voters in the United States as of 2019 (Gramlich, 2020).
Data Collection
This research relied on Amazon Mechanical Turk as its main method of data collection.
Amazon Mechanical Turk—which is often referred to as MTurk—is a crowdsourcing platform
where individuals are compensated for participating in surveys and other task-oriented projects.
Screening questions helped narrow qualified participants to ensure that results reflected the
intended population.
The survey took approximately five minutes to complete, and participants were given
$0.60 as compensation. The decision regarding the amount of compensation was largely made
because of a similar study conducted by Edgerly and Vraga (2019), who compensated MTurk
participants $0.60 for a 6-minute survey.
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Questionnaire Development
The questionnaire developed for this research study consisted of questions related to
demographics, political identification, and perceptions surrounding three elements of Twitter: (a)
fake news, (b) credibility and effectiveness of verification, and (c) credibility and effectiveness
of Notices on Twitter. These perceptions were examined using (1) a series of one word text
responses, (2) a series of 5-point semantic differentials, and (3) a series of 5-point Likert scales.
Measures
The scale used for political orientation was adapted from van der Linden et al. (2020) and
was determined by self-placement according to the following options: very liberal, liberal,
conservative, and very conservative.
The 5-point semantic differential scales, which were used to analyze perceptions of fake
news and the credibility of verification and Notices, was taken from Edgerly and Vraga (2019),
with the semantics being both replicated and adapted for this study. The scales were reduced
from 7-point to 5-point in order to stay consistent with other measures. Some measurements
from Gaziano and McGrath (1986) were also included.
•

Fake news on Twitter: common/uncommon, dangerous/not dangerous, concerning/not
concerning, easy to identify/hard to identify, controlled/uncontrolled, botgenerated/human-generated, minor problem/major problem

•

Verification on Twitter: credible/not credible, accurate/inaccurate, biased/not biased,
can be trusted/cannot be trusted, watches out for users’ interests/does not watch out for
users’ interests, concerned with the community’s well-being/not concerned with the
community’s well-being, concerned with public interest/not concerned with public
interest, creates skepticism/creates confidence
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•

Notices on Twitter: credible/not credible, accurate/inaccurate, biased/unbiased, can be
trusted/cannot be trusted, watches out for users’ interests/does not watch out for users’
interests, concerned with the community’s well-being/not concerned with the
community’s well-being, concerned with public interest/not concerned with public
interest, tell the whole story/do not tell the whole story, separate fact and opinion/do not
separate fact and opinion, factual/not factual, prevent expression/do not prevent
expression, censor/do not censor
Likert scales were used to evaluate the perceptions of fake news and the effectiveness of

verification and Notices. These scales asked participates to rank responses about statements on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree. The measurement for
this research was taken from Matthes (2012) and Schulz et al. (2020) and was adapted for this
particular study.
•

Fake News
1. Fake news on Twitter is more common today than it was 5 years ago
2. Fake news on Twitter should be monitored or addressed by Twitter

•

Verification
1. Verification on Twitter slows the spread of fake news
2. Verification on Twitter eliminates the spread of fake news
3. Verification on Twitter contributes to the spread of fake news
4. Verification on Twitter is effective in reducing the spread of fake news
5. Verification on Twitter leads people to find accurate information
6. Verification on Twitter decreases belief in the accuracy of Tweets from unverified
accounts
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7. Verification on Twitter is dangerous
8. Verification on Twitter is beneficial
•

Notices
1. Notices on Twitter slow the spread of fake news
2. Notices on Twitter eliminate the spread of fake news
3. Notices on Twitter contribute to the spread of fake news
4. Notices on Twitter are effective in reducing the spread of fake news
5. Notices on Twitter lead people to find accurate information
6. Notices on Twitter are dangerous
7. Notices on Twitter are beneficial
8. Notices on Twitter create confidence in the accuracy of news on the platform
9. Notices on Twitter raise concerns related to censorship
10. Notices on Twitter are against the First Amendment
Results
The survey was accessed by 347 individuals, but 48 did not qualify to participate due to

their responses to screening questions related to age or frequency of Twitter use. An additional
13 responses were removed for quality control, leaving 286 completed surveys that met the
population requirements of the research.
Of the sample, 34.6% (n = 99) were female, 64.7% (n = 185) were male, and 0.7% (n =
2) identified as other or preferred to not say. These results closely reflect the reported population
on Twitter, which had approximately 38.4% female users and 61.6% male users as of January
2021 (Statista Research Department, 2021a). In addition, 27.3% (n = 78) of respondents were
ages 18-29, 46.5% (n = 133) were 30-39, and 26.2% (n = 75) were 40-49 (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Age (n = 286)
18-29
27.3% n = 78

30-39
46.5% n = 133

40-49
26.2% n = 75

While gender and age are reported in these results, the main demographic related to this
research was political orientation (see Table 2). As reported by Wojcik and Hughes (2019), 63%
of Twitter users ages 18-49 identify as leaning or being Democrat. The results of this survey are
consistent with this statistic, with 63% of participants identifying as liberal or very liberal. This
indicates that the results reported in this research are likely to closely reflect the perceptions of
Twitter users overall.
Table 2
Political Orientation (n = 286)
Very liberal
21.7% n = 62

Liberal
41.3% n = 118

Conservative
27.6% n = 79

Very conservative
9.4% n = 27

Additionally, it is worth reporting the frequency of Twitter use among those qualified for
the survey. As indicated in Table 3, approximately 95% of respondents access the platform at
least weekly, with more than two-thirds accessing Twitter daily.
Table 3
Twitter Use (n = 286)
Daily
70.6% n = 202

At least once a week
24.1% n = 69

At least once a month
5.3% n = 15

Fake News on Twitter
RQ1: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding fake news?
The first question research participants were asked in the fake news section of the survey
was, “What is the first word that comes to mind when you hear the term fake news?” By far, the
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most common response was “Trump” (n = 79), which was 67 mentions ahead the second most
common, “Fox” (n = 12). The top 10 responses are listed in Table 4.
Table 4
First word that comes to mind when hearing the term “fake news”
1. Trump

n=
79

2. Fox

12

3. Republicans

10

4. Fraud

10

5. CNN

9

6. Bot

9

7. False

7

8. Bad

7

9. Propaganda

6

10. Misleading

6

In spite of the huge gap between “Trump” and the rest of the responses, themes were
identified that tightened the results. Donald Trump was still the most common theme (n = 84),
but words with similar meanings to “fake”—fraud, false, dishonest, misinformation, misleading,
deception, manipulation, lying, lies, fabrication, propaganda—was second (n = 51), media was
third (n = 27), and Republicans/conservatives was fourth (n = 12).
Beyond these initial impressions, the survey sought to understand aspects such as impact,
source, and frequency of fake news on Twitter, among other things. Table 5 provides descriptive
statistics regarding these measures.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Fake News on Twitter (n = 286)

1. Common/uncommon

M
2.18

SD
1.13

2. Dangerous/not dangerous

2.07

1.17

3. Concerning/not concerning

2.02

1.20

4. Easy to identify/hard to identify

2.87

1.10

5. Controlled/uncontrolled

3.46

1.22

6. Bot-generated/human-generated

3.24

1.09
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7. Minor problem/major problem

3.86

1.12

8. Is more common today than it was 5 years ago

4.18

1.06

9. Should be monitored or addressed by Twitter

4.04

1.10

Based on these results, Twitter users largely feel that fake news on the platform is
common, dangerous, concerning, and a major problem. Furthermore, the majority of respondents
indicated that fake news is more common on Twitter today than it was five years ago, suggesting
that current efforts to combat misinformation might not have a significant impact in preventing
its frequency, including its existence, impact, and spread. Nevertheless, respondents as a whole
“agreed” that fake news on the platform should be monitored or addressed by Twitter (M = 4.04,
SD = 1.10).
Verification on Twitter
General perceptions regarding verification marks were analyzed by asking respondents,
“What is the first word that comes to mind when you hear the term verification mark?” The most
common response was “check” (n = 19), with “Twitter” (n = 17) and “celebrity” (n = 17) tying
for second. The top 10 responses are listed in Table 6.
Table 6
First word that comes to mind when hearing the term “verification mark”
1. Check

n=
19

2. Twitter

17

3. Celebrity

17

4. Real

14

5. Trust

10

6. Good

10

7. Fact

9

8. Blue

8

9. Security

8

10. Verified

7
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When analyzing these responses for common themes, it became apparent that Twitter
users largely associate verification marks with prominence (n = 27), checkmarks (n = 25),
verified status (n = 25), authenticity (n = 23), accuracy (n = 20), Twitter (n = 17), and
trustworthiness (n = 15).
RQ2: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the credibility of verification?
Respondents were specifically asked whether verification on Twitter was credible or not
credible, with the results on a 5-point semantic scale indicating that users overall leaned toward
the credibility of verification (M = 2.45, SD = 1.24). The remaining measures regarding
credibility were captured in additional statements (see Table 7). Notably, each of the individual
credibility measures were rated less credible than the credibility measure itself, with each mean
value calculating at higher than 2.45.
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Credibility of Verification on Twitter (n = 286)

1. Credible/not credible

M
2.45

SD
1.24

2. Accurate/inaccurate

2.46

1.17

3. Not biased/biased

2.96

1.30

4. Can be trusted/cannot be trusted

2.54

1.15

5. Watches out for users’ interests/does not watch out for users’ interests

2.72

1.22

6. Concerned with community’s well-being/not concerned with community’s well-being

2.70

1.50

7. Concerned with public interest/not concerned with public interest

2.62

1.22

8. Creates confidence/creates skepticism

2.51

1.20

The mean values for the remaining credibility measures suggest that Twitter users as a
whole feel that verification on Twitter tends to meet the components of credibility. However, the
mean value regarding bias sat almost directly in the middle of the scale (M = 2.96, SD = 1.30),
the lowest of the individual credibility measures.
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RQ3: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the effectiveness of verification in
slowing the spread of fake news?
Responses related to the effectiveness of verification on Twitter in slowing the spread of
fake news generally show middling opinions, with a slight incline that supports that they do (see
Table 8). Twitter users were specifically asked if they felt verification was effective in reducing
the spread of fake news, and although opinions were not overwhelmingly strong, the sentiment
fell on the side of agreeing with the statement (M = 3.20, SD = 1.23). Table 8 provides
descriptive statistics regarding all statements.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Effectiveness of Verification on Twitter (n = 286)

1. Slows the spread of fake news

M
3.18

SD
1.18

2. Eliminates the spread of fake news

2.76

1.31

3. Contributes to the spread of fake news

2.82

1.21

4. Is effective in reducing the spread of fake news

3.20

1.23

5. Leads people to find accurate information

3.30

1.12

6. Decreases belief in the accuracy of Tweets from unverified accounts

3.13

1.18

7. Is dangerous

2.52

1.25

8. Is beneficial

3.49

1.13

These results indicate that verification on Twitter does not have a significant impact on
eliminating, reducing, or slowing the spread of fake news, nor does it have a large influence on
leading people to find accurate information. However, users overall do not consider the feature to
be dangerous (M = 2.52, SD = 1.25), and they typically find the feature beneficial (M = 3.49, SD
= 1.13).
Notices on Twitter
General perceptions regarding Notices on Twitter were analyzed by asking respondents,
“What is the first word that comes to mind when you hear the term social media warning label?”
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The most common response was “caution” (n = 19), with “danger” (n = 17) and “Facebook” (n =
9) rounding out the top three. The top 10 responses are listed in Table 9.
Table 9
First word that comes to mind when hearing the term “social media warning label”
1. Caution

n=
19

2. Danger

17

3. Facebook

9

4. Warning

8

5. Report

7

6. Misinformation

7

7. Censorship

6

8. Bias

6

9. Useful

6

10. Alert

5

While responses on this question varied greatly, a few common themes emerged from the
responses. The top five themes highlighted that social media warning labels are associated with
caution (n = 52), censorship (n = 19), misinformation (n = 15), beneficial (n = 14), and social
media (n = 11).
RQ4: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the credibility of Notices?
Just as was done with verification, research participants were specifically asked if
Notices on Twitter were credible or not credible, with the results on a 5-point semantic scale
indicating that users overall leaned toward the credibility of Notices (M = 2.57, SD = 1.24). The
remaining measures regarding credibility of Notices were captured in additional statements (see
Table 10).
Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Credibility of Notices on Twitter (n = 286)

1. Credible/not credible

M
2.57

SD
1.25

2. Accurate/inaccurate

2.57

1.22
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3. Not biased/biased

2.94

1.33

4. Can be trusted/cannot be trusted

2.67

1.27

5. Watch out for users’ interests/do not watch out for users’ interests

2.65

1.28

6. Concerned with community’s well-being/not concerned with community’s well-being

2.59

1.27

7. Concerned with public interest/not concerned with public interest

2.54

1.26

8. Tell the whole story/do not tell the whole story

3.11

1.25

9. Separate fact and opinion/do not separate fact and opinion

2.82

1.31

10. Factual/not factual

2.73

1.20

11. Do not prevent expression/prevent expression

3.01

1.32

12. Do not censor/censor

2.96

1.30

The majority of mean values for each of the individual credibility measures suggest that
Twitter users overall tend to believe that Notices meet the components of credibility. Just as with
verification, however, the mean value regarding bias was near the center of the scale (M = 2.94,
SD = 1.33), as was expression (M = 3.01, SD = 1.32) and censoring (M = 2.96, SD = 1.30). In
addition, respondents indicated by a slight margin that Notices do not tell the whole story (M =
3.11, SD = 1.25).
In comparing perceived credibility across variables, a t-test revealed that there was no
statistically significant difference between the perceived credibility of verification on Twitter and
the perceived credibility of Notices on Twitter, t(285) = -1.614, p = .108
RQ5: What are the perceptions of Twitter users surrounding the effectiveness of Notices in
slowing the spread of fake news?
Responses related to the effectiveness of Notices on Twitter in slowing the spread of fake
news show a slight incline toward the belief that Notices aid in this effort (see Table 11). Table
11 provides descriptive statistics regarding all statements.
Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Effectiveness of Notices on Twitter (n = 286)

1. Slow the spread of fake news

M
3.28

SD
1.19

2. Eliminate the spread of fake news

2.78

1.29
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3. Contribute to the spread of fake news

2.58

1.26

4. Are effective in reducing the spread of fake news

3.17

1.21

5. Lead people to find accurate information

3.38

1.14

6. Are dangerous

2.60

1.33

7. Are beneficial

3.53

1.17

8. Create confidence in the accuracy of news on the platform

3.40

1.16

9. Raise concerns related to censorship

3.16

1.29

10. Are against the First Amendment

2.69

1.34

Twitter users were specifically asked if they felt Notices were effective in reducing the
spread of fake news, and the sentiment fell on the side of agreeing with the statement (M = 3.17,
SD = 1.21). Notably, however, Notices were seen as slightly less effective in reducing the spread
of fake news than verification (M = 3.20, SD = 1.23). Nevertheless, a t-test revealed that there
was no statistically significant difference between the perceived effectiveness of verification on
Twitter slowing the spread of fake news and the perceived effectiveness of Notices on Twitter in
slowing the spread of fake news, t(285) = .327, p = .744.
The data reported suggests that Notices on Twitter have a minor influence on preventing
the spread of fake news but that they are not necessarily viewed as a contributor in the spread of
fake news. Overall, Notices are seen as beneficial (M = 3.53, SD = 1.17) and create confidence in
the accuracy of news on the platform (M = 3.40, SD = 1.16).
Two notable measures in Table 11 are the last two statements, which relate to censorship
and the First Amendment. The overall attitude of Twitter users is that Notices are not against the
First Amendment (M = 2.69, SD = 1.34) but that they do raise some concerns related to
censorship (M = 3.16, SD = 1.29). These results may suggest that individuals are concerned with
social media companies silencing voices on their platforms but feel these companies are allowed
to do so as private corporations.
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Twitter Perceptions and Political Identification
Although the general perceptions surrounding fake news, verification, and Notices on
Twitter offer valuable insights, one of the main goals of this research was to determine if these
perceptions differed based on political identification. The existing literature has suggested that
political identification may have an impact on attitudes surrounding fake news and social media
warning labels, but more research is needed in this area. Additionally, not much information
exists regarding political orientation and attitudes towards the credibility and effectiveness of
verification marks on Twitter.
RQ6: Do the perceptions surrounding fake news, verification, and Notices differ based on the
political identification of the Twitter user?
Fake News and Political Identification. In analyzing the one-word responses about fake
news, it is worth noting that those who identified as liberal or very liberal were more inclined to
associate fake news with the opposite side of the political spectrum. Of the 180 participants on
the left side of the spectrum, 52.2% (n = 94) referenced conservatism in some form while only
10.5% (n = 11) of those on the right referenced liberalism. More specifically of those on the left,
38.9% (n = 70) referenced Donald Trump and 6.7% (n =12) referenced Republicans, while only
0.3% (n = 2) of those on the right referenced Democrats. Interestingly, 13.2% (n = 14) of those
on the right referenced Donald Trump—a greater percentage than the references to liberalism.
One-way ANOVA tests were performed to compare the effect of political orientation on
perceptions of fake news. A complete overview of ANOVA tests can be found in Table 12 with
mean values for the measures listed by political group in Table 13.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable
dangerous/not dangerous (F(3, 282) = 11.04, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that
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those who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive fake news
as dangerous (M = 1.61, SD = 0.91; M = 1.90, SD = 0.95) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 2.61, SD = 1.34), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable
concerning/not concerning (F(3, 282) = 11.24, p < 0.05. A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that
those who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive fake news
as concerning (M = 1.50, SD = 0.74; M = 1.88, SD = 1.10) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 2.56, SD = 1.37), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable minor
problem/major problem (F(3, 280) = 8.21, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those
who identify as very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive fake news as a major
problem (M = 4.29, SD = 0.89) than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.44, SD = 1.34)
and very conservative (M = 3.59, SD = 1.19), p < 0.05. Additionally, those who identify as
liberal (M = 3.97, SD = 0.94) are significantly more likely to perceive fake news as a major
problem than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.44, SD = 1.34).
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable is more
common today than five years ago (F(3, 282) = 5.35, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed
that those who identify as very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that fake news is
more common today than it was five years ago (M = 4.50, SD = 0.94) than those who identify as
very conservative (M = 3.74, SD = 1.23), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable should be
monitored by Twitter (F(3, 282) = 16.04, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those
who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that fake news
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should be monitored or controlled by Twitter (M = 4.52, SD = 0.72; M = 4.27, SD = 0.89) than
those who identify as conservative (M = 3.53, SD = 1.22), and very conservative (M = 3.44, SD =
1.45), p < 0.05.
Table 12
Analysis of Variance for Perceptions of Fake News on Twitter Between Groups
Variable
1. Common/uncommon

SS
6.46

df
3

MS
2.15

F
1.71

Sig.
0.17

2. Dangerous/not dangerous

41.13

3

13.71

11.04

< 0.01

3. Concerning/not concerning

43.87

3

14.62

11.24

< 0.01

4. Easy to identify/hard to identify

6.05

3

2.02

1.68

0.17

5. Controlled/uncontrolled

8.62

3

2.87

1.94

0.12

6. Bot-generated/human-generated

4.65

3

1.55

1.32

0.27

7. Minor problem/major problem

28.66

3

9.55

8.21

< 0.01

8. Is more common today than 5 years ago

17.21

3

5.74

5.35

< 0.01

9. Should be monitored by Twitter

50.36

3

16.78

16.04

< 0.01

Table 13
Mean Values for Political Orientation and Perceptions of Fake News on Twitter

1. Common/uncommon

V lib
2.00

Lib
2.17

Con
2.39

V con
2.00

2. Dangerous/not dangerous

1.61

1.90

2.61

2.33

3. Concerning/not concerning

1.50

1.88

2.56

2.30

4. Easy to identify/hard to identify

2.60

2.93

2.92

3.04

5. Controlled/uncontrolled

3.64

3.54

3.34

3.04

6. Bot-generated/human-generated

3.06

3.25

3.27

3.56

7. Minor problem/major problem

4.29

3.97

3.44

3.59

8. Is more common today than 5 years ago

4.50
4.52

4.27
4.27

3.94
3.53

3.74
3.44

9. Should be monitored by Twitter

The results of these tests indicate that those on the left side of the political spectrum are
more likely to view fake news as dangerous, concerning, and a major problem. While this data is
notable, the most significant variable related to support toward Twitter monitoring or addressing
fake news on its platform. Those who identify as very liberal are extremely likely to support this
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effort (M = 4.52, SD = 0.72) while those who are very conservative are separated by more than
an entire scale point (M = 3.44, SD = 1.45).
Effectiveness of Verification and Political Identification. In analyzing how political
identification impacted one-word responses about verification, no patterns emerged. The results
of this question offered no consistency in answers among political groups.
One-way ANOVA tests were performed to compare the effect of political orientation on
perceptions of the effectiveness of verification on Twitter in slowing the spread of fake news. A
complete overview of ANOVA tests can be found in Table 14 with mean values for the measures
listed by political group in Table 15.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable eliminates
the spread of fake news (F(3, 282) = 3.21, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those
who identify as very conservative are significantly more likely to perceive that verification on
Twitter eliminates the spread of fake news (M = 3.22, SD = 1.45) than those who identify as very
liberal (M = 2.40, SD = 1.22), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable contributes
to the spread of fake news (F(3, 281) = 9.33, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those
who identify as very conservative and conservative are significantly more likely to perceive that
verification on Twitter contributes to the spread of fake news (M = 3.56, SD = 1.41; M = 3.18,
SD = 1.27) than those who identify as liberal (M = 2.51, SD = 1.13) and very liberal (M = 2.66,
SD = 1.06), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable is dangerous
(F(3, 281) = 17.55, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as
conservative are significantly more likely to perceive that verification on Twitter is dangerous
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(M = 3.27, SD = 1.31) than those who identify as liberal (M = 2.21, SD = 1.06) and very liberal
(M = 2.05, SD = 1.06), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable is beneficial
(F(3, 281) = 3.86, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as very
liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that verification on Twitter is beneficial (M =
3.76, SD = 0.86) than those who identify as very conservative (M = 3.04, SD = 1.48), p < 0.05.
Table 14
Analysis of Variance for Effectiveness of Verification on Twitter Between Groups
Variable
1. Slows the spread of fake news

SS
0.61

df
3

MS
0.20

F
0.14

Sig.
0.93

2. Eliminates the spread of fake news

16.24

3

5.41

3.21

0.02

3. Contributes to the spread of fake news

37.78

3

12.59

9.33

< 0.01

4. Effective in reducing spread of fake news

4.81

3

1.60

1.05

0.37

5. Leads people to find accurate information

5.29

3

1.76

1.40

0.24

6. Decreases belief in unverified Tweets

0.70

3

0.23

0.17

0.92

7. Is dangerous

69.62

3

23.21

17.55

< 0.01

8. Is beneficial

14.28

3

4.76

3.86

0.01

Table 15
Mean Values for Political Orientation and Perceptions of Effectiveness of Verification on Twitter

1. Slows the spread of fake news

V lib
3.11

Lib
3.22

Con
3.19

V con
3.11

2. Eliminates the spread of fake news

2.40

2.73

2.94

3.22

3. Contributes to the spread of fake news

2.66

2.51

3.18

3.56

4. Effective in reducing spread of fake news

2.95

3.28

3.25

3.22

5. Leads people to find accurate information

3.44

3.29

3.13

3.56

6. Decreases belief in the accuracy of Tweets from unverified accounts

3.19

3.09

3.10

3.22

7. Is dangerous

2.05

2.21

3.27

2.70

8. Is beneficial

3.76

3.59

3.29

3.04

Results from these tests indicate that those on the left side of the political spectrum are
more likely to view verification on Twitter as beneficial while those on the right are more likely
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to view it as dangerous. Additionally, those on the right are more likely to believe that
verification contributes to the spread of fake news.
Credibility of Verification and Political Orientation. One-way ANOVA tests were
performed to compare the effect of political orientation on perceptions of the credibility of
verification on Twitter. A complete overview of ANOVA tests can be found in Table 16 with
mean values for the measures listed by political group in Table 17.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable credible/not
credible (F(3, 282) = 5.14, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as
very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that verification on Twitter is
credible (M = 2.26, SD = 1.10; M = 2.22, SD = 1.10) than those who identify as conservative (M
= 2.85, SD = 1.32), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable
accurate/inaccurate (F(3, 281) = 5.20, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who
identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that verification on
Twitter is accurate (M = 2.31, SD = 1.03; M = 2.26, M = 1.01) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 2.89, SD = 1.32), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable not
biased/biased (F(3, 281) = 5.38, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who
identify as liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that verification on Twitter is not
biased (M = 2.69, SD = 1.21) than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.33, SD = 1.25) and
very conservative (M = 3.41, SD = 1.53), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable can be
trusted/cannot be trusted (F(3, 281) = 3.45, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those
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who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that verification
on Twitter can be trusted (M = 2.32, SD = 0.95; M = 2.41, SD = 1.03) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 2.86, SD = 1.30), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable creates
confidence/creates skepticism (F(3, 280) = 3.33, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that
those who identify as liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that verification on Twitter
creates confidence (M = 2.34, SD = 1.09) than those who identify as conservative (M = 2.83, SD
= 1.23), p < 0.05.
Table 16
Analysis of Variance for Credibility of Verification on Twitter Between Groups
Variable
1. Credible/not credible

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

22.76

3

7.59

5.14

< 0.01

2. Accurate/inaccurate

20.33

3

6.78

5.20

< 0.01

3. Not biased/biased

26.01

3

8.67

5.38

< 0.01

4. Can be trusted/cannot be trusted

13.39

3

4.46

3.45

0.02

5. Users’ interests/not users’ interests

7.22

3

2.41

1.63

0.18

6. Community/not community

5.99

3

2.00

1.39

0.25

7. Public interest/not public interest

9.58

3

3.19

2.17

0.09

8. Creates confidence/creates skepticism

13.96

3

4.65

3.33

0.02

Table 17
Mean Values for Political Orientation and Perceptions of Credibility of Verification on Twitter

1. Credible/not credible

V lib
2.26

Lib
2.22

Con
2.85

V con
2.70

2. Accurate/inaccurate

2.31

2.26

2.89

2.41

3. Not biased/biased

2.81

2.69

3.33

3.41

4. Can be trusted/cannot be trusted

2.32

2.41

2.86

2.67

5. Users’ interests/not users’ interests

2.71

2.56

2.95

2.74

6. Community/not community

2.79

2.53

2.85

2.78

7. Public interest/not public interest

2.48

2.50

2.91

2.59

8. Creates confidence/creates skepticism

2.34

2.35

2.83

2.69
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While political groups differed on several points related to credibility of verification on
Twitter as determined by the ANOVA and post-hoc tests, it is worth mentioning that all variable
means across groups fell on the side of leaning towards credibility, with the exception of bias. In
this variable, those who identified as conservative and very conservative were more likely to
mark towards biased (M = 3.33, SD = 1.25; M = 3.41, SD = 1.53), an indication of a lack of
credibility.
Effectiveness of Notices and Political Orientation. The one-word responses about
Notices resulted in a few interesting patterns. The theme of misinformation—which consisted of
misinformation, disinformation, and fake news—was entirely comprised of left leaning
individuals (n = 15). Liberals were also more likely (n = 9) than conservatives (n = 2) to identify
Notices as beneficial. Those who stated Notices were necessary were also all liberals (n = 4).
One-way ANOVA tests were performed to compare the effect of political orientation on
perceptions of the effectiveness of Notices on Twitter in slowing the spread of fake news. A
complete overview of ANOVA tests can be found in Table 18 with mean values for the measures
listed by political group in Table 19.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable slow the
spread of fake news (F(3, 282) = 5.14, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who
identify as liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter slow the
spread of fake news (M = 3.53, SD = 1.08) than those who identify as conservative (M = 2.91,
SD = 1.22), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable contribute to
the spread of fake news (F(3, 281) = 5.20, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those
who identify as very conservative and conservative are significantly more likely to perceive that
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Notices on Twitter contribute to the spread of fake news (M = 3.26, SD = 1.43; M = 3.06, SD =
1.33) than those who identify as liberal (M = 2.29, SD = 1.05) and very liberal (M = 2.19, SD =
1.16), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable lead people
to find accurate information (F(3, 281) = 5.38, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that
those who identify as very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on
Twitter lead people to find correct information (M = 3.65, SD = 1.03) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 3.11, SD = 1.23) and very conservative (M = 2.85, SD = 1.38), p < 0.05.
Additionally, those who identify as liberal are more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter
lead people to find correct information (M = 3.53, SD = 1.00) than those who identify as very
conservative (M = 3.11, SD = 1.23), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable are
dangerous (F(3, 281) = 3.45, p < 0.05. A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as
very conservative and conservative are significantly more likely to perceive Notices on Twitter
as dangerous (M = 3.30, SD = 1.23; M = 3.08, SD = 1.38) than those who identify as very liberal
(M = 2.11, SD = 1.23), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable are
beneficial (F(3, 281) = 3.45, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as
very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter are beneficial (M =
3.95, SD = 0.86) than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.08, SD = 1.74) and very
conservative (M = 3.19, SD = 2.23), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable create
confidence in news on the platform (F(3, 280) = 3.33, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed
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that those who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that
Notices on Twitter create confidence in news on the platform (M = 3.69, SD = 1.04; M = 3.62,
SD = 0.95) than those who identify as conservative (M = 2.99, SD = 1.32), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable raise
concerns related to censorship (F(3, 281) = 3.45, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that
those who identify as very conservative and conservative are significantly more likely to
perceive that Notices on Twitter raise concerns related to censorship (M = 3.85, SD = 1.17; M =
3.72, SD = 1.14) than those who identify as liberal (M = 2.98, SD = 1.18) and very liberal (M =
2.50, SD = 1.32), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable are against
the First Amendment (F(3, 281) = 3.45, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who
identify as very conservative and conservative are significantly more likely to perceive that
Notices on Twitter are against the First Amendment (M = 3.59, SD = 1.28; M = 3.27, SD = 1.27)
than those who identify as liberal (M = 2.41, SD = 1.18) and very liberal (M = 2.10, SD = 1.30),
p < 0.05.
Table 18
Analysis of Variance for Effectiveness of Notices on Twitter Between Groups
Variable
1. Slow the spread of fake news

SS
20.90

df
3

MS
6.97

F
5.16

Sig.
< 0.01

2. Eliminate the spread of fake news

2.41

3

0.80

0.48

0.70

3. Contribute to the spread of fake news

49.72

3

16.57

11.61

< 0.01

4. Effective in reducing spread of fake news

7.42

3

2.47

1.70

0.17

5. Lead people to find accurate information

19.99

3

6.66

5.41

< 0.01

6. Are dangerous

51.34

3

17.11

10.69

< 0.01

7. Are beneficial

33.58

3

11.19

8.85

< 0.01

8. Create confidence in news on the platform

27.51

3

9.17

7.28

< 0.01

9. Raise concerns related to censorship

68.53

3

22.84

15.92

< 0.01

10. Are against the First Amendment

79.45

3

26.48

17.24

< 0.01
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Table 19
Mean Values for Political Orientation and Perceptions of Effectiveness of Notices on Twitter

1. Slow the spread of fake news

V lib
3.40

Lib
3.53

Con
2.91

V con
3.00

2. Eliminate the spread of fake news

2.63

2.85

2.82

2.67

3. Contribute to the spread of fake news

2.19

2.29

3.06

3.26

4. Effective in reducing spread of fake news

3.29

3.29

2.92

3.11

5. Lead people to find accurate information

3.65

3.53

3.11

2.85

6. Are dangerous

2.11

2.38

3.08

3.30

7. Are beneficial

3.95

3.70

3.08

3.19

8. Create confidence in news on the platform

3.69

3.62

2.99

3.04

9. Raise concerns related to censorship

2.50

2.98

3.72

3.85

10. Are against the First Amendment

2.10

2.41

3.27

3.59

Notably, one of the two variables that did not return a statistically significant result
between groups was effective in reducing the spread of fake news, suggesting that there is no
difference between groups in this attitude. However, other measures returned significant results
between groups related to the effectiveness of Notices in slowing the spread of fake news, such
as slow the spread of fake news, indicating that the topic is more complex than one variable.
Because groups differed on eight of the 10 measures, it appears that there is a significant
difference between political groups.
Credibility of Notices and Political Identification. One-way ANOVA tests were
performed to compare the effect of political orientation on perceptions surrounding the
credibility of Notices on Twitter. A complete overview of ANOVA tests can be found in Table
20 with mean values for the measures listed by political group in Table 21.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable credible/not
credible (F(3, 282) = 13.77, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as
very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter are
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credible (M = 2.18, SD = 1.03; M = 2.26, SD = 1.02) than those who identify as conservative (M
3.20, SD = 2.96) and very conservative (M = 2.96, SD = 2.73), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable
accurate/inaccurate (F(3, 282) = 9.13, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who
identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on
Twitter are accurate (M = 2.18, SD = 1.05; M = 2.36, SD = 1.06) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 3.05, SD = 1.27), p < 0.05. Additionally, those who identify as very liberal are
significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter are accurate (M = 2.18, SD = 1.05)
than those who identify as very conservative (M = 2.96, SD = 1.53), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable not
biased/biased (F(3, 281) = 5.06, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who
identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on
Twitter are not biased (M = 2.70, SD = 1.17; M = 2.71, SD = 1.21) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 3.32, SD = 1.41), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable can be
trusted/cannot be trusted (F(3, 281) = 11.50, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those
who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on
Twitter can be trusted (M = 2.18, SD = 1.06; M = 2.45, SD = 1.13) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 3.22, SD = 1.27) and very conservative (M = 3.15, SD = 1.61), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable watch out
for users’ interests/do not watch out for users’ interests (F(3, 282) = 17.53, p < 0.05). A post-hoc
Tukey test revealed that those who identify as very liberal, liberal, and very conservative are
significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter watch out for users’ interests (M =
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2.15, SD = 1.14; M = 2.36, SD = 1.10; M = 2.74, SD = 1.56) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 3.43, SD = 1.19), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable concerned
with community’s well-being/not concerned with community’s well-being (F(3, 280) =
8.26, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as very liberal and liberal
are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter are concerned with the
community’s well-being (M = 2.19, SD = 1.14; M = 2.41, SD = 1.18) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 3.13, SD = 1.23), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable concerned
with public interest/not concerned with public interest (F(3, 282) = 14.72, p < 0.05). A post-hoc
Tukey test revealed that those who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more
likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter are concerned with public interest (M = 2.05, SD =
1.12; M = 2.26, SD = 1.11) than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.15, SD = 1.23) and
very conservative (M = 3.07, SD = 1.41), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable tell the
whole story/do not tell the whole story (F(3, 282) = 5.02, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test
revealed that those who identify as very liberal and liberal are significantly more likely to
perceive that Notices on Twitter tell the whole story (M = 2.81, SD = 1.16; M = 2.97, SD = 1.15)
than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.53, SD = 1.25), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable separate fact
and opinion/do not separate fact and opinion (F(3, 281) = 12.31, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey
test revealed that those who identify as very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that
Notices on Twitter separate fact and opinion (M = 2.35, SD = 1.20; M = 2.56, SD = 1.09) than
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those who identify as conservative (M = 3.46, SD = 1.36) and very conservative (M = 3.19, SD =
1.52), p < 0.05. Additionally, those who identify as liberal are significantly more likely to
perceive that Notices on Twitter separate fact and opinion (M = 2.56, SD = 1.09) than those who
identify as conservative (M = 3.46, SD = 1.36), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable factual/not
factual (F(3, 280) = 14.90, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who identify as
very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter are factual (M =
2.16, SD = 0.98) than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.33, SD = 1.15) and very
conservative (M = 3.11, SD = 1.50), p < 0.05. Additionally, those who identify as liberal are
significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter are factual (M = 2.54, SD = 1.07)
than those who identify as conservative (M = 3.33, SD = 1.15), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable do not
prevent expression/prevent expression (F(3, 281) = 10.60, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test
revealed that those who identify as very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that
Notices on Twitter do not prevent expression (M = 2.27, SD = 1.24) than those who identify as
conservative (M = 3.39, SD = 1.30) and very conservative (M = 3.70, SD = 1.38), p < 0.05.
Additionally, those who identify as liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices
on Twitter do not prevent expression (M = 2.94, SD = 1.21) than those who identify as very
conservative (M = 3.70, SD = 1.38), p < 0.05.
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the variable do not
censor/censor (F(3, 281) = 6.99, p < 0.05). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that those who
identify as very liberal are significantly more likely to perceive that Notices on Twitter do not
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censor (M = 2.45, SD = 1.24; M = 2.88, SD = 1.18) than those who identify as conservative (M =
3.35, SD = 1.32) and very conservative (M = 3.37, SD = 1.52), p < 0.05.
Table 20
Analysis of Variance for Credibility of Notices on Twitter Between Groups
Variable
1. Credible/not credible

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

56.47

3

18.82

13.77

< 0.01

2. Accurate/inaccurate

37.38

3

12.46

9.13

< 0.01

3. Not biased/biased

25.71

3

8.57

5.06

< 0.01

4. Can be trusted/cannot be trusted

50.21

3

16.74

11.50

< 0.01

5. Users’ interests/not users’ interests

73.76

3

24.59

17.53

< 0.01

6. Community/not community

37.13

3

12.38

8.26

< 0.01

7. Public interest/not public interest

61.34

3

20.45

14.72

< 0.01

8. Tell whole story/do not tell whole story

22.54

3

7.51

5.02

< 0.01

9. Separate fact and opinion/do not

56.60

3

18.87

12.31

< 0.01

10. Factual/not factual

56.38

3

18.79

14.90

< 0.01

11. Do not prevent expression/prevent

50.43

3

16.81

10.60

< 0.01

12. Do not censor/censor

33.60

3

11.20

6.99

< 0.01

Table 21
Mean Values for Political Orientation and Perceptions of Credibility of Notices on Twitter

1. Credible/not credible

V lib
2.18

Lib
2.26

Con
3.20

V con
2.96

2. Accurate/inaccurate

2.18

2.36

3.05

2.96

3. Not biased/biased

2.70

2.71

3.32

3.37

4. Can be trusted/cannot be trusted

2.18

2.45

3.22

3.15

5. Watch out for users’ interests/do not watch out for users’ interests

2.15

2.36

3.43

2.74

6. Concerned with community/not concerned with community

2.19

2.41

3.13

2.77

7. Concerned with public interest/not concerned with public interest

2.05

2.26

3.15

3.07

8. Tell the whole story/do not tell the whole story

2.81

2.97

3.53

3.22

9. Separate fact and opinion/do not separate fact and opinion

2.35

2.56

3.46

3.19

10. Factual/not factual

2.16

2.54

3.33

3.11

11. Do not prevent expression/prevent expression

2.27

2.94

3.39

3.70

12. Do not censor/censor

2.45

2.88

3.35

3.37

The results of these tests indicate that political orientation has a significant influence on
the perceptions surrounding the credibility of Notices on Twitter. Generally speaking, the data
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suggests that those on the left side of the political spectrum are more likely to view Notices as
credible while those on the right side of the scale are more likely to view Notices as not credible.
Discussion
This study analyzes the perceptions surrounding fake news, verification, and Notices on
Twitter. Verification and Notices were examined to determine if they are viewed as credible and
effective in slowing the spread of fake news on the platform. All variables were analyzed in light
of political orientation to determine if differences existed between those who identify as very
liberal, liberal, conservative, and very conservative. The research findings have important
implications for politics, social media, communications theory, and Twitter specifically.
The Prevalence of Fake News
Results of this study indicate that Twitter users largely view fake news as dangerous,
concerning, and a significant issue. These findings support the literature, which illustrates that
the majority of individuals who use social media are concerned with fake news being used as a
weapon (Edelman, 2020), wonder if the information they are accessing is accurate (Shearer &
Matsa, 2018; Edelman, 2020), and question the credibility of news from these sources (Rubin,
2019).
The most likely reason for these beliefs is due to the prevalence of fake news in today’s
world, particularly on social media. Those who participated in this research consider fake news
to be common on Twitter, and one of the highest mean values from survey results indicates that
most respondents feel like fake news is more prevalent on the platform today than it was five
years ago (M = 4.18). This finding could, in part, suggest that current efforts to combat the
spread of misinformation on Twitter might not have as strong of an impact as desired. This
subject will be explored further later in the discussion in connection with additional findings
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from this research, including the fact that users do not view warning labels as particularly
effective in slowing the spread of fake news.
The increased amount of fake news on Twitter is also likely due to an increased number
of users who intentionally or unintentionally contribute to the spread of misinformation. In just
under five years—from Q1 of 2017 to Q3 of 2021—the number of daily active users on Twitter
has practically doubled, increasing from 109 million to 211 million (Statista, 2022). While it is
impossible to know how many of these users are sharing fake news in online conversations, it is
undeniable that the sheer increase in daily active users would also increase the amount of
misinformation being posted on the platform—an issue that stems from online realities, such as
the ability to conceal one’s identity and safely hide behind the screen.
Although social media platforms cannot vet every individual who creates an account,
perhaps these companies should implement stronger requirements and features to better ensure
the legitimacy of accounts. With the majority of research participants indicating that they believe
Twitter should monitor or address fake news on the platform, it is clear that users at large expect
more from platforms than what they are currently doing to combat the spread of misinformation.
These findings thus have important implications for social media platforms who are attempting
to connect with the needs of their users.
Fake News and Politics
Another important outcome of this research is its insights regarding fake news and
politics. The results of this study support the finding by van der Linden et al. (2020) that liberals
and conservatives associate fake news with outlets of the opposite political identification, with
several right-wing individuals in the study mentioning CNN and several left-wing individuals
mentioning Fox News. This is not surprising given the heated political landscape in the United
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States and the growing skepticism that exists regarding news networks, particularly networks
with the opposing perspective of the viewer.
Expanding upon this finding, results also indicate that the term “fake news” is largely
associated with conservatism—particularly among liberals but also among some conservatives. It
is important to note, however, that the association among conservatives in this research study is
solely with Donald Trump. The connection to conservatism at large—and the significant amount
of connection to Donald Trump—could be explained by the fact that Donald Trump popularized
the term, which would also explain why several conservatives stated Trump in their response.
Nevertheless, a deeper analysis suggests that there is more to this finding.
As noted in the results, more than 50% of left-leaning study participants associate fake
news with Donald Trump, Fox News, Republicans, and conservatives, while just over 10% of
right-leaning participants referenced words connected with liberalism. While the measures of this
study do not fully explain the reasons for these results, the findings suggest that liberals are much
more likely than conservatives to connect fake news with the opposing political wing. This could
be due to any number of reasons, but one possible explanation is the way that liberals tend to feel
about conservatives. Results from a 2020 Pew Research Center survey indicate that liberals are
significantly less likely to date a conservative than a conservative is to date a liberal (Brown,
2020), and a 2014 Pew Research Center survey revealed that liberals are more likely to unfriend
someone on a social network over differences in politics (Mitchell et al., 2014). Gramlich (2016)
also noted that Clinton supporters had a more difficult time respecting Trump supporters than the
other way around. Findings like these suggest liberals may tend to be skeptical of the character
and integrity of conservatives as individuals, which could explain why the majority of leftleaning individuals in this study associated fake news with conservatism.
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In contrast, conservatives were more inclined to identify characteristics of fake news,
such as fraud. In some ways, this is surprising given the fact that Donald Trump often associated
the term with left-leaning news networks such as CNN and MSNBC, which certainly could have
influenced the way right-leaning participants responded in this survey. Interestingly, however,
there was a larger percentage of conservative participants who referenced Donald Trump than
those who referenced liberalism—13% to about 10% respectively.
These findings are important because they indicate that there are significant differences in
the way people think of fake news, especially based on their political orientation. Results suggest
that liberals are more likely to associate the term with the opposing political viewpoint, perhaps
seeing the term through a cynical lens. At the same time, results suggest that conservatives are
more inclined to connect fake news with other things that have become associated with the term,
such as fraud, CNN, and Donald Trump. As shown by this study, the term “fake news” may be
more politically charged for liberals than it is for conservatives.
Verification Inconsistencies
Perceptions surrounding verification as analyzed in this study suggest that the feature is
generally viewed as credible; however, Twitter users overall don’t feel that verification has much
of an impact on reducing the spread of fake news and do not feel overly confident that the feature
leads individuals to find accurate information. These results are not necessarily surprising given
the fact that the main purpose of the verification mark as utilized by Twitter is to authenticate
users (Cohen & Sutton, 2018; Twitter Support, 2017; “Verification FAQ,” n.d.). Nevertheless,
the platform hoped that updates made to the verification process in 2021 would also increase the
credibility of content on the platform and would better allow users to determine if conversations
are trustworthy (Twitter Inc., 2021). And although users may typically view news from verified
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accounts as more credible than not, the feature itself does not appear to ensure that users are
receiving information that is any more accurate than that from unverified accounts.
These findings raise important points related to the concept of verification, including the
reality that inconsistencies continue to exist in Twitter’s explanation of the feature. The platform
has long emphasized that verification does not equal endorsement, but this is contradicted by the
explanation of its current process. After all, and as mentioned above, Twitter has suggested that
verified status should help users better determine if content is trustworthy (Twitter Inc., 2021).
This explanation implies that Twitter views verified accounts as better sources of credible
information, even though any generic user could publish content just as credible—if not more
credible—than someone with a verification mark. And since the platform limits verification to
select groups, including government, journalists, entertainers, and athletes (“Verification FAQ,”
n.d.), the feature consequently and inevitably creates endorsement only for specific categories as
judged by Twitter. Twitter thus appears to be suggesting that it has more confidence in its users
with prominent societal status than it does in its everyday users. These realities should concern
Twitter users, because it indicates that their opinions are automatically viewed as less credible
than those with verified status.
Furthermore, research has shown that users with a verified status often receive enhanced
credibility (Paul et al., 2019). This suggests that regardless of how Twitter defines the feature, it
can be difficult to alter the way that individuals have been conditioned to think. It is quite likely
that because verification on Twitter is represented by a checkmark, some users may associate the
feature with credibility without consciously realizing that they are doing so.
These explanations are possibly some of the reasons that credibility of verification as
analyzed in this study was viewed near the middle of the scale for the measure biased. With the
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platform limiting verification to select groups, many users may feel that their voices are viewed
as less important—a point analyzed in previous paragraphs. Perhaps more frustrating to users is
the knowledge that Twitter previously allowed all accounts to apply for verified status but later
removed that option. While Twitter has justified their decision to alter the process of verification,
it does not explain why an individual of prominence is any more qualified to be verified than a
general user, nor does it explain why verified accounts are seen by Twitter as more likely to
enhance the quality and credibility of conversations on the platform.
With all of this in mind, it is worth mentioning that Twitter’s current application of
verification might actually be harming the credibility of the feature—both perceived and real.
The limitation of the feature to certain groups—and the fact that it is largely extended to only
influential and well-known individuals—calls into question its ultimate function and purpose.
Opening verification to all users may not solve the dilemma because it would dilute the value of
the feature, as noted by Edgerly and Vraga (2019). Nevertheless, the platform continues to dance
around the concept of endorsement while also discreetly suggesting that verified accounts should
be viewed as more credible. Additionally, Twitter’s frequent changes to the verification process
over only a few years makes it difficult for users to keep up with the purposes behind the
alterations, potentially causing skepticism regarding the feature for some users.
Twitter, as well as other platforms who utilize a verification mark, should thus consider
both how and why the feature is being used and consider ways that they can ensure that verified
status is meeting its purpose, fulfilling its definition, and avoiding bias. The challenge for Twitter
and other platforms will be creating an environment where verification can be viewed as credible
and unbiased while also avoiding the appearance of endorsement. This may require a complete
overhaul of the verification system as it currently exists.
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New Applications of Gatekeeping
As illustrated in the literature, the theory of gatekeeping has expanded due to new
technologies and the increased simplicity of news distribution by everyday consumers (Benham,
2020; Cormode & Krishnamurthy, 2008). While traditional newsroom gatekeeping has long been
accepted by consumers, this research suggests that individuals are less inclined to support new
applications of gatekeeping, such as warning labels and other efforts implemented by social
media platforms.
The findings of this particular study—in connection with the existing literature—call into
question the use of top-down gatekeeping on social media. Research has suggested that bottomup efforts used to combat the spread of fake news might be viewed as more credible and thus
might be more effective (Colliander, 2019). It is no secret that users at large mistrust social
media platforms, which means that top-down efforts utilized by these companies are likely to
result in skepticism from consumers. Furthermore, the past failures of social media platforms to
effectively implement and utilize features like verification and warning labels have likely led to
cynicism.
As noted by Colliander (2019), some social media outlets are moving away from the use
of warning labels, in part because users are more likely to rely on other consumers when it comes
to determining what is credible. Additionally, 54% of Americans indicated that they were more
concerned about social media platforms censoring truth than they were about fake news (Kemp
& Ekins, 2021). Perhaps these are some of the reasons that Notices are overwhelmingly viewed
as not especially credible or effective in reducing the spread of fake news. Furthermore, the fact
that 75% of social media users do not trust platforms to make fair content moderation decisions
(Kemp & Ekins, 2021) may also play a role in this attitude.
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Gatekeeping vs. Censorship
Results from this study go so far as to suggest that top-down gatekeeping applications,
including warning labels, raise concerns related to censorship. The most likely explanation for
why these gatekeeping practices are more likely to be opposed—and are sometimes viewed as
censoring—is because consumer voices are the ones being silenced. Although news published
through traditional newsrooms can silence voices, there is no doubt that individuals will feel it
more personally when their words on their accounts are flagged or removed. Online platforms
are designed to offer a voice to all, which enables individuals to shape the news and influence
public discourse (Messner & Garrison, 2009; Poor, 2006). Thus, when social media companies
inhibit users from contributing to the conversation, some consumers will feel that there is an
overreach in content moderation.
This is particularly relevant in the political climate that currently exists in the United
States. As illustrated by this research, the attitudes towards Notices are likely to differ based on
the political identification of the user, with those on the right viewing them as less credible than
those on the left. This is not surprising given previous research, which shows that conservatives
feel social media platforms are doing too much content moderation while liberals feel they are
not doing enough (Kemp & Ekins, 2021; Stjernfelt & Lauritzen, 2020).
Additionally, the results of this research indicate that those on the right are more likely to
view Notices as a method of censoring and preventing expression. This largely supports findings
from the existing literature, which illustrate that some individuals feel that it is not in the best
interest of the public to allow platforms to prevent expression (Daseler, 2019). One reason that
those on the right may feel more passionate about censorship is because conservatives are more
likely to be censored and have their accounts suspended (Stjernfelt & Lauritzen, 2020; Kemp &
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Ekins, 2021). Furthermore, this could be a larger reflection of the difference in attitudes toward
rules and regulation that exists between liberals and conservatives. Just as conservatives prefer
small government, this research suggests that conservatives also prefer small tech. It is worth
noting, therefore, that warning labels are likely to be less supported by those on the right because
of both the political bias in content moderation and conservative attitudes toward regulation by
establishments at large.
Interestingly, however, censorship concerns on Twitter still appear to exist to some extent
in spite of political orientation. This may be connected with the perceived credibility of Notices,
since survey variables such as tell the whole story/do not tell the whole story and do not prevent
expression/prevent expression fell on the less credible side of the general scale (M = 3.11, M =
3.01). While those on the right ranked these measures as significantly less credible than those on
the left, even those who identified as very liberal and liberal were not very confident that Notices
tell the whole story (M = 2.81, M = 2.97).
On the other hand, perceptions surrounding verification differed in a few measures based
on political orientation. The most notable distinction from survey results is that those on the right
side of the spectrum were more likely to view verification as dangerous while those on the left
were more likely to view it as beneficial. This finding supports the aforementioned reality that
conservatives typically want less regulation and are more inclined to distrust establishments. The
fact that those who identified as conservative and very conservative view verification on Twitter
as biased (M = 3.33, M = 3.41) supports the idea that individuals on the right tend to be skeptical
of most regulatory bodies.
These findings are important because of the implications they have on communications
theory. As gatekeeping continues to expand and evolve, researchers should consider how these
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changes are impacting consumers and their attitudes toward gatekeeping efforts. As illustrated
previously, individuals appear to be increasingly more skeptical of increased regulations,
including company executives and policies that impact the ability to consume news more freely.
These realities are likely to continue altering attitudes about gatekeeping, especially in the digital
age where consumers have become accustomed to the ease of accessing information without
restriction.
Connected with this is the impact that these efforts are having on attitudes toward social
media platforms. These results suggest that social media platforms should be conscious of topdown gatekeeping efforts. Distrust in platforms is real, and gaining that trust back requires that
companies are involved in efforts that communicate a willingness to meet consumer needs and
listen to users rather than continuing to communicate executive power.
Notices vs. Verification
To further analyze top-down gatekeeping efforts on Twitter, results suggest that warning
labels on the platform are viewed as slightly credible, though they are seen as less credible than
verification. Furthermore, Notices are seen as slightly less effective in slowing the spread of fake
news than verification. This is significant because Notices are largely viewed as the main feature
currently utilized by Twitter to combat the spread of misinformation on the platform (“Notices
on Twitter,” n.d.).
As indicated in the existing literature, warning labels are largely controversial (Clayton et
al., 2020), can be ineffective (Fardouly & Holland, 2018; Pennycook et al., 2020), and can have
a negative impact on users (Pennycook et al., 2020). If Notices are viewed as less effective and
less credible than verification—a feature on the platform which is primarily used to authenticate
(Cohen & Sutton, 2018; Twitter Support, 2017; “Verification FAQ,” n.d.) rather than combat
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fake news—then it is quite possible that Notices are not producing the results Twitter is
expecting or desiring.
Freedom of Consumption
With both features being viewed essentially the same when it comes to combatting the
spread of fake news, it is worth discussing if the use of Notices should be eliminated—at least
for posts related to potential misinformation, since Twitter also utilizes the feature for offensive
and graphic content. As identified earlier, it is quite possible that a few of the reasons for these
attitudes toward warning labels are opposition to top-down gatekeeping, distrust in social media
platforms, and concerns related to censorship. All of these reasons are interwoven into a larger
tapestry that primarily comes down to the desire for “freedom of consumption.”
Because this study analyzes Twitter users in the United States, it is important to highlight
specific circumstances related to this audience that drive freedom of consumption. These include
freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment and the ease to instantly access
information from just about anywhere at any time in the digital age. The main purpose of
warning labels as utilized by Twitter and other social media platforms is to reduce, limit, or hide
the content that users can consume. Not only does this compete with traditional American values
that have largely enabled freedom of consumption, but it also expands and enhances the power of
those in executive positions. Furthermore, social media platforms have long communicated that
they connect individuals and lend everyone a voice—however, their efforts to moderate content
contradict the supposed purpose of their existence.
Additionally, the internet has provided users with a path around traditional methods of
gatekeeping. This has enabled them to access an unlimited amount of information and has also
allowed them to determine what news they receive. With social media platforms implementing
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new methods of gatekeeping, individuals are once again facing the realities associated with
people and policies that determine what they receive. Because consumers are no longer used to
this in the digital age, it is likely that they find these realities frustrating—and ultimately may
view efforts to limit what they receive as ineffective and not credible, as illustrated by the results
of this research. With warning labels standing in the way of freedom of consumption, social
media platforms may want to consider how they can respect the desires of users while also
implementing ideas that will help address the concern surrounding fake news.
Conclusion
One limitation of this research was the limited number of participants who identified as
very conservative. At times, it seemed as though the data for this group was not as accurate as
expected, likely due to the small size of the group, which amounted to only 9.4% of the research
participants (n = 27). Research has shown that this group makes up a relatively small percentage
of Twitter users, with only 12% identifying as very conservative (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019).
Nevertheless, future studies would benefit from ensuring that they have a reputable number of
participants who identify as very conservative to be able to analyze this group in greater depth
and with greater accuracy.
Additionally, this study only views perceptions of fake news, verification, and Notices
(i.e., warning labels) on Twitter and by users of the platform. Future research should investigate
if these results hold true across other social media sites that utilize similar features.
With the credibility of Notices being called into question by those on the political right,
and with the effectiveness of Notices not being viewed as particularly strong by Twitter users at
large, it is worth asking if Notices are the best approach to combat the spread of fake news. The
existing literature has also raised questions about Notices as a method to slow the spread of fake

70
news, indicating that regardless of what social media platforms believe, their users are not certain
that this method is the right answer. Nevertheless, this study does suggest that there is strong
support for Twitter monitoring or addressing fake news on the platform.
Because of the complexity associated with content moderation, Twitter simply won’t be
able to fully address the problem of fake news, especially in a way that is fully supported by all
330 million of its diverse users. However, the platform should certainly consider alternative
methods to combat the spread of fake news. As indicated in the literature, the platform is
currently testing a new feature known as Birdwatch, which is a community-based effort against
misinformation (Coleman, 2021). This relies on bottom-up gatekeeping efforts, which may be
viewed by users as more credible and effective than top-down efforts. Twitter should continue to
refine this feature and work on implementation to see if it is viewed as more effective than
warning labels. The platform could also seek ways to better help users become responsible media
consumers rather than passive participants who rely on others to tell them what is true and what
is not.
These recommendations also apply to other social media platforms who are likely facing
similar challenges when it comes to combatting the spread of fake news. Consumers across these
platforms are likely to have similar views to those on Twitter and may even be less supportive of
content moderation due to political orientation differences that may exist on other channels. At a
minimum, all platforms should consider the use of alternative methods in the fight against fake
news.
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